

GHANA

JOINT SECTOR REVIEW ASSESSMENT

Advancing Mutual Accountability through Comprehensive,
Inclusive, and Technically Robust Review and Dialogue

September 2014

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We acknowledge the contribution and support of all stakeholders who consented to speak with us despite their busy schedules. Our special appreciation goes to Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) staff, particularly those at the Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (PPMED), the Medium-Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan Steering Committee (METASIP SC) members, development partners, academia, and private sector operators. We are also grateful to Manson Nwafor of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and the review team for their inputs. Finally, we are grateful for inputs made by development partners on the chapters on policy and institutional review, which were used in preparing the Ghana New Alliance report.

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ACRONYMS

AAGDS	Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy
ADC	Agricultural Development Corporation
ADVANCE	Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement
AEA	Agricultural Extension Agent
agGDP	agriculture gross domestic product
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AgriServ	New Agricultural Services Limited
AgSSIP	Agriculture Services Sector Investment Programme
AMSEC	Agricultural Mechanization Service Center
APPDF	Agricultural Public Private Dialogue Forum
APR	annual progress report
ASAC	Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit
ASIP	Agricultural Subsector Investment Project
ASWG	Agricultural Sector Working Group
AU	African Union
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CAADP PP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme Partnership Platform
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COCOBOD	Ghana Cocoa Board
CSOs	civil society organizations
CSD	Central Securities Depository
CSIR	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
DADU	district agricultural development unit
DPs	development partners
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FABS	Food and Agriculture Budgetary Support
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FBO	faith-based organization
FASDEP	Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy
FBOs	farmer-based organizations

FINSAP	Financial Sector Investment Programme
GASIP	Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme
GCAP	Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project
GDP	gross domestic product
GHC	Ghanaian cedis
GIDA	Ghana Irrigation Development Authority
GIPC	Ghana Investment Promotion Centre
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GoG	government of Ghana
GPRS	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GSDA	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
ha	hectare
ICT	information and communications technology
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
JSR	joint sector review
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MDAs	ministries, departments, and agencies
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
METASIP	Medium-Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan
MMDAs	metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies
MoFA	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MoU	memorandum of understanding
MoYS	Ministry of Youth and Sports
MSA	Meteorological Services Authority
MSC	METASIP Steering Committee
mt	metric tonnes
MTADP	Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme

NAEP	National Agricultural Extension Project
NAFCO	National Buffer Stock Company
NAIP	National Agricultural Investment Plan
NARP	National Agricultural Research Project
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	nongovernmental organizations
NLSP	National Livestock Services Project
NRC	National Redemption Council
NSA	nonstate actor
PEF	Private Enterprise Foundation
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PPMED	Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate
PPRSD	Plant Protection and Regulatory Services Directorate
RADU	regional agricultural development unit
RCBs	rural and community banks
RELC	Research-Extension Linkage Committee
ReSAKSS	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
RTIMP	Root and Tuber Improvement and Marketing Program
SADA	Savannah Accelerated Development Agency
SAKSS	Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SC	Steering Committee
SMS	short message service
SRID	Statistics, Research and Information Department
SWAp	sector-wide approach
ToRs	terms of reference
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In any sector, policy dialogue is a critical component to efficient and harmonious policymaking and implementation. A joint sector review (JSR) is an annual review of the sector to identify where challenges are preventing coherent dialogue. In Ghana, the first agriculture JSR was instituted in 2008 with the goal of reaching a common point-of-view among key sector stakeholders on important achievements in the preceding year. Stakeholders include the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA); development partners (DPs); other ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs), the private sector, and civil society. In addition, the JSR seeks to review key remaining implementation challenges in the sector; assesses progress against strategic reform priorities and toward expected outputs and outcomes; and develop clear recommendations to prioritize reforms that feed into medium-term planning and budgeting exercises. This can be achieved through a sector-wide stakeholder meeting and consultation.

This stocktaking assessment was conducted to provide an overview of the JSR process, explain sectoral progress as a baseline for subsequent JSRs, and assess progress in policymaking and institutional strengthening, which are key components of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework. The study uses both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative methods used secondary data from MoFA, Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), and other sources. Qualitative approaches are mainly key informant discussions, informal interviews, and reviews of existing documents.

Status and Quality of the JSR Process

While the Ghana JSR process has been successfully sustained over the past five years, there is a need to adjust some aspect of the process including two key challenges: (1) poor participation by invitees and (2) ineffective implementation and monitoring of courses of action. For the former, participation could be increased through short communications and briefings of participants prior to the JSR as well as informing participants of their specific tasks and groups. More important, effective participation can be increased by having a wider representation of stakeholders—namely, the Medium-Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan Steering Committee (MSC)—lead the JSR process with the support of the JSR secretariat. For the latter, ensuring how the output of the JSR affects change, current data as well as verification of implementation through random field visits, “ground truthing,” or random surveys of key informants would help.

Policy Review

Ghana’s policy process has seen improvements in recent years. Despite an emphasis on evidence-based planning, however, the lack of current data proves a challenge. The review also shows that financing as well as human resource constraints impede effective implementation of the policies. Thus, while most dimensions of the policy process are adequate and require minimal attention, the quality of policy planning and execution requires serious attention to improve the situation. As the lead ministry, MoFA is therefore expected to take appropriate action to address the challenge.

Beginning in 2014, encouraging activities have already been launched to encourage improvements in the agriculture policy environment. One is completion of Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (GASIP), which may be the new agricultural strategic framework following the end of the METASIP in 2015. GASIP should be more focused and have a better alignment between planning, resource allocation, and implementation than the METASIP and thereby address some of the concerns raised about the METASIP. The second encouraging development is a commitment to operationalize a single comprehensive national agricultural policy framework that is monitored closely and reported on a quarterly basis to everyone in the country.

Institutional Review

A wide range of stakeholders participated in the formulation of the country's current investment plan—METASIP—and continue to be involved in the sector's activities in varying capacities and intensities. At the governmental level, coordination between ministries was found to be weak. Although civil society and other nonstate actors are members of the METASIP Steering Committee, the effectiveness of their use of this platform is low due to some organizational challenges in both the ministry and stakeholders' institutions. This and the absence of other strong platforms have also led to weak nonstate actors participating in the policy process. Several aspects of the shortcomings have been recognized over the years, and there appears to be more willingness and support now to address the issues. Institutionalizing post-JSR action plans and formalizing the process of implementing them—thereby holding everyone accountable for achievements—is a good example of how improvements can be made moving forward. The current effort to strengthen the Agricultural Public Private Dialogue Forum (APPDF) will also strengthen institutional linkages. In addition, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is providing assistance to boost the capacity of the METASIP Steering Committee, its Secretariat, and committee members.

Review of Key Financial and Nonfinancial Commitments

As committed stakeholders, the government, DPs, and other nonstate actors (NSAs) have important roles to play to ensure successful implementation of sector policies and programs as well as effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E). From the study, it is clear that while some commitments have been progressively fulfilled, others have not. The key observation is that while government has tried to fulfill its financial commitments, its nonfinancial commitments remain moderately achieved. This suggests that perhaps some of the targets under the METASIP are unrealistic. Alternatively, it could mean that implementation has been poor and M&E has been weak. The DPs are on track to meet their financial commitments under the New Alliance framework and are also making progress in related nonfinancial areas. The low rate of achievement of the government's financial commitments contrasts with the on-track performance of the DPs and suggests that there is scope for more METASIP funding.

Agriculture Sector Performance Baselines

The contribution of the agriculture sector to poverty reduction has been declining in recent years, with key indicators of progress such as sectoral growth experiencing a decline recently. Fortunately, pre-2010 growth and poverty reduction achievements allowed the country to achieve key Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

early. In recent years, the country also had to depend on the nonagriculture sectors to drive per capita GDP growth. In order to reduce the geographical poverty gaps between urban and rural areas and between northern and other regions, the agriculture sector will need to drive growth more in coming years. This will require improvements in the volume and quality of spending; accessibility of services and inputs; and improved policy and project planning, implementation, and evaluation in general.

Main Conclusions and Recommendations

In terms of leading the JSR process, the METASIP Steering Committee should play a key role with the support of the JSR Secretariat. The Steering Committee should lead the process of developing the JSR agenda and terms of reference with input from stakeholders. As it currently exists, the JSR elicited poor participation by some stakeholders, which was due not only to low attendance levels but also to ineffective contributions to discussions. This may stem from certain stakeholders not seeing the issues being discussed as their top priorities, a lack of confidence in the process, a lack of capacity to effectively participate, fear of victimization for criticizing the government or leaders (particularly the political appointees), and domination of the meetings by MoFA and DPs. To avoid repeating this setback, the terms of reference production process for the JSR should be improved by increasing the participation of nonstate actors via the METASIP Steering Committee. Participants should also be informed of their group and the agenda prior to the JSR to allow for preparation and follow-up discussions. Farmers' organizations and associations need a lot of capacity building in good governance and better appreciation of sector policies.

Implementation and monitoring of action plans from the JSR was inadequate. Clearly, there is a lack of follow-through on recommendations and action plans. One way to improve this might be to make clearer the membership and roles of the JSR Secretariat as well as of other groups tasked with follow-up actions that arise from the JSR. We recommend that the various implementing agencies are also tasked to report their progress. This will instill much more commitment to the implementation the JSR commitments.

In terms of preparing background reports and evidence for the JSR, the Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (PPMED), Statistics, Research and Information Department (SRID), and the Ghana- Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) should be tasked with carrying out evaluations to contribute to the JSR. This will aid in institutionalizing the culture of policy-oriented research and support the current practice of knowledge sharing that takes place in the JSR. It is also important to assess the progress of different stakeholders—in terms of the commitments made (within and outside the JSR) in the MoFA Annual Progress Report (APR), which serves as the basis for the JSR. In terms of timing, there needs to be many months of preparation prior to the JSR, which would allow adequate time to identify issues, collate information, and assemble available technical and financial resources in a more consultative way. Additionally, the timing of the JSR is often after the sectoral budget has been finalized. Thus, the additional implementation cost that might arise from the JSR recommendations is unbudgeted. Instead, resource mobilization to implement the JSR recommendations should be a priority. The timing of the JSR (in May) should be moved to August, and its implementation cost should be included in the sector budget. Otherwise, a contingency fund should be established for implementation of the JSR's recommendations.

Policy planning and implementation have not been adequate due to capacity and financial constraints, delays, and institutional lapses. MoFA as the lead agency lacks technical capacity to implement some aspects of METASIP. Again there is poor and inconsistent funding of agricultural policy research and analysis institutions and organizations as well as logistics that will allow them to undertake investment planning with minimum stress. The government and all sector stakeholders should honor their financial and other commitments to make financial and other resources available for implementation. Also, availability of reliable data and evidence-based information is another major constraint that needs to be addressed to improve the design and implementation of sector plans. The GSS and SRID of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in particular will need further support to be able to collect the data and information required to support an evidence-based policy process.

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1. Background

To accelerate growth through agriculture-led development while reducing poverty, hunger, and malnutrition, Ghana signed a CAADP Compact in 2009. The Compact is an agreement that states individual African governments will achieve two key targets: (1) allocate 10 percent of their national budgets to the agriculture sector and (2) achieve economic growth in the agriculture sector by 6 percent annually. The focus of the CAADP process in Ghana is to strengthen and add value to the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy II (FASDEP II) and the National Development Programme METASIP (Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan).

Specifically, the CAADP process in Ghana is to support strategic planning in Ghana's agricultural sector by: (1) helping define a coherent long-term framework to guide the planning and implementation of current and future FASDEP II programs; and (2) developing synergies and complementarities between existing and new SAKSS to facilitate peer review, dialogue, and evidence-based planning and implementation of agricultural sector policies and strategies.

Since Ghana's independence, governments have attempted to modernize agriculture. Despite the policies variously pursued by different governments, agricultural growth and modernization have been slow, and a large number of production techniques have remained the same. But with the introduction of new policies, strategies, and programs over the past decade or so, improvement is expected to occur in a sector that employs almost 42 percent of the population and contributes 23 percent to GDP (GSS 2012). This JSR stocktaking contributes to the sector's effort at tracking performance as a means to harmonize and align sector policies, institutions, and commitments for overall agricultural growth. It also serves as a benchmark for tracking progress over the years.

1.2. Approach Used for the Study and Limitations of the Report

In the study, respondents were first screened based on their knowledge of policies, cooperation agreement programs, and institutional structure within the agricultural sector. Respondents with no sector knowledge or very poor knowledge were not included. The study employed a number of approaches in soliciting information from stakeholders in the agricultural sector, which included:

- Structured interviews with stakeholders at the inception meeting for the study;
- Consultation with MoFA to obtain relevant documents;
- Review of documents to identify various policies and existing data;
- Scanning through websites of organizations for current data;
- Stakeholder interviews;
- Informal discussions;
- Consultation with DPs and other NSAs; and
- Consultation with academia.

Ultimately, a total of 37 people from different state and nonstate institutions were interviewed. Issues discussed broadly covered the JSR process, including the extent of consultations and actors involved; gaps and relevant action plans to fill them; policy issues such as existing and emerging policies, quality of planning and execution, and consistency and alignment of policies; institutional issues such as alignment for successful METASIP and other cooperation, implementation, and capacity; financial and nonfinancial commitments by stakeholders in the sector; and agricultural performance indicators such as food availability, food security, income, poverty reduction, and agricultural GDP growth and growth rates. A major limitation of this study is the inability to contact a larger number of stakeholders due to time limitations. However, attempts were made to get a cross-section of stakeholders in the sector. The authors based their assessments on the perspectives of stakeholders interviewed, a literature review, and data obtained from various sources.

1.3. Summary

The stocktaking study for the JSR complements efforts at tracking the progress of agricultural sector policy implementation. In undertaking the stocktaking study, both quantitative as well as qualitative approaches have been employed. Quantitative methods involved use of secondary data from MoFA, GSS, and other sources. Qualitative approaches used key informant discussions, informal interviews, and a review of existing documents.

This report is organized into seven sections. Section 1 covers the introduction, background, and research approaches of the study. Section 2 focuses on the status and quality of the JSR process in Ghana by looking into the consultative process, areas and sectors covered by the JSR, key decisions and commitments arising out of the JSR, and gaps and action plans to implement the JSR. The third section looks at the policy environment with specific focus on the inventory of existing and emerging policies, quality of planning and execution, consistency of policy mix, policy consistency gaps, and implementation status. Section 4 provides a review of institutions and implementation capacity while Section 5 details the financial and nonfinancial commitments of stakeholders. Sections 6 and 7 are dedicated to agricultural performance baselines and conclusions, respectively.

2. STATUS AND QUALITY OF THE JSR PROCESS IN GHANA

2.1. Introduction

Since 2008, the Joint Sector Review (JSR) of Ghana's agriculture sector has been carried out annually as a key instrument for supporting mutual accountability and engendering consensus among the sector's major stakeholders. Essentially, the JSR serves as a foundation for evidence-based policy planning and implementation as well as a means for assessing the effectiveness of policies and institutions and the extent to which intended results and outcomes in the sector are being realized. Thus, the JSR is a management and policy support tool for inclusive stakeholder planning, programming, budget preparation and execution, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and overall development of the agriculture sector.


However, since the JSR was first initiated, no study has been undertaken to critically assess its process in an effort to assess its effectiveness. This section performs such an assessment by detailing the consultative process followed in Ghana, including who is involved and their roles in the process; areas and sectors covered by the reviews; key decisions and commitments arising out of the JSR and the responsible actors; gaps in the process; and measures to bridge the gaps.

2.2. The JSR Consultative Process in Ghana

Since the start of the JSR in 2008, the consultative process remains invariably the same with only slight modifications and improvement in participation in some years. Usually, the JSR process begins with an initiation stage by MoFA and the DPs through the agriculture sector working group and ends with development of deliverable reports, or an *aide memoire* (see Figure 2.1). Prior to an inaugural meeting, a planning committee composed of MoFA and DP representatives with PPMED as secretariat prepares the terms of reference (ToRs) agrees on the timing and goals of the review, and communicates information to participants. MoFA and the DPs then initiate the inaugural or inception meeting, which often lasts one day and forms the basis for the agreement of the ToRs, the composition of thematic groups or clusters based on priority areas, endorsement of leadership for the review, and a series of presentations related to the agricultural sector.

The JSR process is co-led by a representative from both MoFA and the DPs. At the inaugural or inception meetings, four thematic groups or clusters are usually formed based on participants' knowledge of the priority areas. Each group usually comprises six people representing MDAs and DPs. Each group then selects a leader and a secretary (or *rapporteur*). These groups undertake about one week of intensive training by reviewing existing documents or scholarships; participating in meetings, consultations, and field visits; and concluding with reports on key findings and recommendations. Finally, the documents are compiled and presented as a draft *aide memoire*. After a wrap-up meeting with review leaders, the *aide memoir* is finalized. The directorate of the MoFA co-leader provides administrative support for the review process with assistance from PPMED, which is expected to track progress of implementation of recommendations (MoFA 2009b). It should be noted that the entire duration for the JSR from inception to wrap-up meeting is often not longer than two weeks.

FIGURE 2.1: JOINT SECTOR REVIEW CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN GHANA



Source: Authors.

Since 2011, however, instead of an inception and wrap-up meeting being held separately, one meeting lasting three days was held. Instead of the intensive two weeks of fieldwork, group work was usually done during these three days at the workshop venue. Again, about four groups formed in most of the JSRs and would then present group reports after their discussions. After the third day of meetings, an *aide memoire* is prepared.

It seems that since 2011, studies commissioned by task teams or consultants were relied on to generate reports for the JSR. Useful analytical work is also considered for presentation and discussion, even if it was not initiated directly as a result of the JSR. In the planning of many of the JSRs, the annual progress report of the ministry is referred to as the basis of the JSR. However, its contents have not always reflected a sectoral approach to reviewing performance. Recently, its contents are more of a program review of the METASIP. While a review of the METASIP is crucial, such an approach leaves little room to coherently x-ray factors underpinning the performance of the METASIP implementation and the performance of the sector as a whole. Such factors include

agriculture funding and the economic and agriculture policy environment. Clearly, an examination of the trends in these areas can shed light on underpinning factors that need to be addressed or managed.

From the start of the JSR process in 2008–2009, participants for the inaugural or inception meetings were mainly MoFA staff and DPs. However, from 2010–2013, the scope of the participants was widened to include MDAs, METASIP Steering Committee (MSC) members, the private sector, farmer-based organizations (FBOs), and civil society organizations (CSOs). For instance, whereas in 2009 the participants were mainly MoFA staff and ten DPs, the number of participants had increased substantially in 2011 to 100 and included more stakeholder groups (See Table 2.1).

TABLE 2.1: GHANA JOINT SECTOR REVIEW PARTICIPANTS, COMPOSITION, AND DURATION (BY YEAR)

Year	Theme/Title	No. of Participants	Composition of Participants	Duration
2008		MoFA staff + 10 DPs	MoFA, DPs	NA
2009	Government of Ghana/development partners' joint agricultural sector performance review	54	MoFA (31); GoG (8); DPs (10); GIDA, SASH, and others (5)	22 May–3 June (13 days)
2010	Agricultural sector performance review	NA	MoFA, DPs, private sector, civil society, nontraditional actors, technical review team from the ECOWAS Secretariat, Chair of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Agriculture	19–31 May (13 days)
2011	Agricultural sector performance review	100	MoFA (45), DPs (17), METASIP Steering Committee (12), MDAs and other nonstate actors (26)	22–24 June (3 days)
2012	Joint Performance Review of the Agriculture Sector	115	MoFA (45), private sector (12), DPs (22), MSC (13), other MDAs (23)	8–10 May (3 days)
2013	Joint Agriculture Sector Review	118	MoFA (45), the private sector (12), DPs (22), MSC (13), other MDAs (23)	28–30 May (3 days)

Source: Compiled by author from JSR *aide memoirs* for various years (2009–2013).

Notes: In order to avoid inadvertently counting people twice, the number of participants is limited to invitees of the JSR inaugural three-day meeting. Members are often drawn from this list of invitees (the aggregate) for the initial phase for (1) analytical or background documents preparation phase; (2) field visits and validation phase; and (3) possibly drafting of *aide memoir* phase. Assuming attendees that were not invited equal absentee invitees, the number of participants shown in the table is true. MoFA=Ministry of Food and Agriculture; DPs=development partners; GoG=government of Ghana; GIDA=Ghana Irrigation Development Authority; ECOWAS=Economic Community of West African States; METASIP= Medium-Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan Steering Committee; MDAs=ministries, departments, and agencies; MSC=METASIP Steering Committee.

The participants were narrowly drawn across the regions in Ghana. For instance, in 2013, a total of 118 participants were selected with a majority of them stationed in Accra. This raises two major issues worth confronting. First, it suggests that probably current financial and logistical support for the JSR is not adequate, such that involving more participants from outside Accra could perhaps substantially increase the cost of organizing the

JSR meetings. Second, it could also be due to limited time and high workloads of the initiation team members, which limits their ability to make an inclusive search for other possible stakeholders outside Accra. Possibly this might stem from the lack of a permanent JSR planning committee. (The JSR planning committee is drawn from the agriculture sector working group, but membership of the JSR committee is not permanent and the committee is formed prior to each JSR. Some members of the previous year’s JSR often retain their membership, however.) The results also indicate that a decentralized JSR at the regional or district level may help.

2.3. Key Questions, Areas, and Sectors Covered by the JSR

Throughout the JSR, a number of key questions, areas, and sectors appear common and recurrent over the years, although there are few additions or changes. From Table 2.2, four objectives appear apparent for all the JSRs, which may be based on the formation of their four working groups. However, three of these objectives run across the years. New objectives or questions are raised based on emerging issues. For instance, considering the need for the development of the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP), the 2009 and 2010 JSRs also focused on NAIP and CAADP. Similarly, with METASIP in place, it was necessary to evaluate progress in its implementation. Therefore, the 2013 JSR paid special attention to the METASIP.

TABLE 2.2: KEY OBJECTIVES OF THE JOINT SECTOR REVIEW

YEAR	OBJECTIVES/AREAS					
	To assess the extent of implementation of work programs and ascertain progress toward the achievement of expected outputs and outcomes of the agricultural sector (MoFA performance).	To assess major policy initiatives of MoFA and their effectiveness and an assessment of the two budget support operations (CIDA’s FABS and the World Bank’s AgDPO).	To report progress of implementation of the previous year’s JSR recommendation.	To appraise the National Agricultural Investment Plan put forward under the CAADP process and contribute to preparations for the CAADP Roundtable scheduled for June 2009.	To identify innovations and progress in addressing the challenges farmers and others in the agricultural sector are facing.	To evaluate progress of METASIP implementation from 2008 to 2012 and determine the way forward.
2009						
2010						
2011						
2012						
2013						

Source: Compiled by authors from JSR report, various years.

Notes: MoFA=Ministry of Food and Agriculture; CIDA’s FABS=Canadian International Development Agency’s Food and Agriculture Budgetary Support; AgDPO=Agriculture Development Policy Operation; CAADP=Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme; METASIP= Medium-Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan Steering Committee;

Also, although the JSR is a sector review, it does not focus on specific subsectors of agriculture but rather on policies and programs across the subsectors of agriculture. From Table 2.3, 13 broad areas, shown by color

variations, have so far been considered in the JSR. The first area, which runs parallel across the years and is therefore shown in different shades of the same color (green), looks at the performance of the agricultural sector and achievements of program or policy objectives. Besides 2013, each year's JSR looked at four major areas, although some of the areas considered were not distinctly different from the previous years. In 2009 and 2010, JSRs focused on the same areas (see Table 2.3). It is not apparent what determines the choice of focus areas, but it is certain that they might be influenced by the previous year's areas of focus, recommendations, and emerging issues (as exemplified by the inclusion of the New Alliance as an area of focus in 2013). Useful reports from completed studies, which are deemed important for sector review, also influence the agenda for the JSR. In recent years, the policy subgroup of the agriculture sector working group, in particular, has been tasked with identifying the issues to be discussed or reviewed. These issues are then presented for approval at the larger agriculture sector working group meetings, after which the JSR planning committee adheres to them.

TABLE 2.3: KEY AREAS COVERED BY THE JOINT SECTOR REVIEW

Year	Areas					
2009	Area 1: Sector Performance in 2008 and Achievement of Policy/Program Objectives	Area 2: Achieving FASDEP II and MoFA's Delivery Capability	Area 5: Budgeting, Planning and Aid Delivery and Monitoring and Evaluation	Area 9: Procurement and Financial Management		
2010	Sector Performance in 2009 and Achievement of Policy/ Program Objectives	Review the Sector's Capability to Deliver on METASIP	Planning and Budgeting, SWAp, and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)	Procurement and Financial Management		
2011	Sector Performance in 2010 including Budgetary Support Program	Area 3: Studies on MoFA Program and Extension	Area 6: Issues on Irrigation, Fisheries, and Value Chain Development	Area 10: Management and Coordination Issues		
2012	Sector Performance in 2011 and Achievement of Policy/Program Objectives	Review of Recommendations of MoFA Policy Initiatives including Fertilizer Subsidy, NAFCO, AMSEC, and Block Farm Program	Area 7: Review of policies/ Concepts to Improve Agric. Research and Environmental Sustainability	Area 11: Agricultural Research and Financial Management		
2013	Review of Sector Performance in 2012	*Area 4: Report on Progress of Implementation of 2012 JSR Recommendation	Area 8: METASIP Review	Review of Planning, Budgeting, and Coordination Processes in the Sector	Area 12: Status of Policy Actions under New Alliance and Proposed a National Ag. Policy Matrix	Area 13: Decentralization Policy in Relation to METASIP

Source: Compiled by authors from JSR report, various years.

Notes: Cells with the same color imply the areas of focus are similar or the same. See acronym list at beginning of document.

*Between 2009 and 2012, Area 4 was executed by four groups, with each reviewing the progress of the joint sector review under the specific area assigned to the particular group. In 2013, however, special emphasis was placed on reviewing the progress of implementation, and it emerged as a unique area of focus.

2.4. Key Decisions and Commitments Arising from the JSR and Responsible Actors

Since the inception of the JSR in 2008, a number of key decision points and commitments have been variously reached. These decisions and commitments were entrusted to some specific group of actors in the sector. Table 2.4 provides a summary of some of the key decisions and commitments of the JSRs.

These decisions are often held as *aide memoires*, developed into an action plan at the business meetings, and given to the agriculture subsector working groups for implementation. However, the ad-hoc JSR implementation committee is entrusted with monitoring and reporting any implementation progress, which is usually done at the next JSR meeting.

TABLE 2.4: SUMMARY OF KEY DECISIONS OR COMMITMENTS

2009			2010			2012		
Key Decision	Implementers	Timelines	Key Decision	Implementers	Timelines	Key Decision	Implementers	Timelines
A systematic review of critical MoFA programs.	MoFA with technical assistance from DPs	All reviews completed to input into 2009 APR	Reviews of major programs: A cost benefit and beneficiary analysis should be undertaken for the following major initiatives: (1) Agriculture Mechanization Services Enterprise Centers; (2) Block Farming Programme; (3) Fertilizer Subsidy Programme. A risk analysis of the National Food Company's (NAFCO's) operations should be done so that the factors that led to the collapse of the National Food Distribution Company are not repeated.	MoFA with support from sector stakeholders	Before 2010 Annual Performance Review.	Focus APR Report on METASIP and de-emphasize MoFA.	MoFA, NDPC, DPs, stakeholders	2013 APR is based on METASIP
Clear operational procedures for core MoFA programs to be published, defining (1) roles and responsibilities of MoFA staff (at various levels); (2) any cost-sharing arrangements (if applicable); (3) financing sources (MoFA headquarters, regional agricultural development unit (RADU), district agricultural development unit (DADU)).	MoFA, technical directorates	Published by end of 2009	Irrigation policy and strategic plans, including a cost/benefit and beneficiary analysis should be developed. Progress reports indicating the percentage of work done on projects and cost elements should be developed.	MoFA, GIDA	Policy and strategic plan published by end 2010.	Create awareness on joint planning and synchronize, harmonize, and prioritize plan and build capacity of stakeholders, including MoFA, MMDAs, CSOs. Do joint strategic planning with DPs & CSOs, and budget with key stakeholders (NDPC, MMDAs, and DPs).	MoFA, NDPC	End of July 2012
A concerted effort to revitalize RELCs by (1) improving coordination with CSIR in aligning incentives for researchers, (2) clarifying funding sources for RELC structures within RADU budgets; and (3) using interactions with FBOs as a conduit for improved sensitization of farmers on RELCs and their functioning.	MoFA, CSIR, with support from DPs	Approach prepared for implementation during FY2010	Human resource capacity: The ability of the sector to deliver on METASIP programs must be improved by: (1) Ensuring that MoFA has the number of appropriate personnel required; (2) ensuring that personnel have the necessary training; (3) carrying out a functional review by all Directorates to identify their function within MoFA at the national, regional, and district levels; (4) recruiting more female recruits to MoFA, especially at the managerial level.	MoFA	(1) Ongoing, (2) ongoing, and (3) all reviews to be completed by the end of 2010, and (4) ongoing.	Code all agriculture related expenditure by MoFA and MMDAs as a prelude to mapping and tracking agriculture expenditure.	MoFA, MMDAs, NDPC	End of July 2012

Development of comprehensive approach for supporting FBOs (including water user associations) to: (1) reposition MoFA to better support FBO as key institutions within the value chains; (2) take advantage of the FBO registration to classify FBOs by functions and adapt specific support structures according to their needs (recognizing FBOs have different forms and objectives); (3) ensure appropriate legal foundation for FBOs; and (4) collaborate with rural financial institutions and the proposed ADIF to ensure that FBOs can access financial products (including insurance).	MoFA, MoFEP, MoYS, RCBs, with DP support	Program developed for FY2010	Budgetary Processes: Improve the budgeting process by: (1) Ensuring that all FASDEP policy objectives are captured in the plans of the RADUs and DADUs; (2) ensure that the budget allocations to RADUs and DADUs are based upon workplans submitted and are adequate to allow implementation of plans through the MTEF process; (3) RADUs and DADUs should be trained and provided adequate information on sector policies, including the METASIP; (4) conducting trend analysis (Budgeting Unit of PP MED) to estimate the budget ceilings earlier in the budgeting process; and (5) ensuring continuous strengthening of the policy framework M&E system.	MoFA	(1) Ongoing, (2) ongoing, (3) all training and information dissemination to be completed by the end of 2010, (4) ongoing, and (5) ongoing.	Develop modules and guidelines for planning in accordance with METASIP. All district budget officers should be using these modules and guidelines and trained in subsector policies with METASIP.	MoFA, NDPC, and stakeholders	End of 2012
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Source: Compiled by authors from Ghana Joint Sector Review reports.

Note: See acronym list at beginning of document.

2009			2011			2012		
Key Decision	Implementers	Timelines	Key Decision	Implementers	Timelines	Key Decision	Implementers	Timelines
Initiate improvement in budgeting.	MoFA, MoFEP	For 2010 budget preparation	RELCs Process Continue to improve on the RELCs process by (1) ensuring that RELCs activities are included in MoFA budgets; (2) ensuring long-term planning for continuous funding for research; (3) finalizing, publishing, and implementing an RELC Manual.	MoFA, CSIR with support from sector stakeholders	(1) Ongoing, (2) ongoing, (3) manual to be finalized, published, and implemented by end of 2010. Policy and strategy in place by end of 2010.	Carry out METASIP orientation in all districts. Draft METASIP implementation strategies with emphasis on MoFA, DPs, CSOs, and other stakeholders and publicize achievements of the agriculture sector.	MoFA, NDPC, DPs	End of 2012

2009			2011			2012		
Key Decision	Implementers	Timelines	Key Decision	Implementers	Timelines	Key Decision	Implementers	Timelines
Functional review of MoFA. Implementation of the communications strategy to improve inter-and intra-Ministerial communication. Completion of HR database.	MoFA with technical assistance from DPs	Committee established and functional review underway by the end of 2009	FBOs: There is a need to implement a policy and strategy for FBO development that includes clear guidelines on their formation, registration, and operation. The MoFA FBO Secretariat should be decentralized to regions and districts to increase access for farmers.	MoFA		Align METASIP Steering Committee membership to that of a Ministerial Advisory Board.	MoFA	By August 2012
Improved coordination among MDAs on agriculture sector-related interventions.	MoFA with other MDAs (in particular Transport, COCOBOD, Science and Education)	Initiated during 2010 budget process	CAADP process and SAKSS (1) Improve coordination between sector stakeholders through implementation of the CAADP process; (2) ensure that all MoFA Directorates and MoFA staff are aware of and are part of the CAADP process; (3) the CAADP Team should be identified, vetted, and be operationalized; (4) the Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) should be activated to (promote evidence-based strategic decision making; and (5) METASIP programs need to be prioritized.	MoFA, all sector stakeholders	(1) Ongoing, (2) ongoing, (3) by end of June 2010, (4) by end of 2010, (5) by end of 2010	MoFA management to submit comments in 2012 PPB training report to MoFEP.	MoFA Head, Budget Division of PPMED	By 31 of May 2012
Improved integration of M&E arrangements of DP projects into MoFA's M&E arrangements and coordination of project reviews with the JSR.	DPs, with support from MoFA	ongoing	Procurement and Financial Management (1) Review overall progress of procurement and financial management, paying particular attention to timely disbursements, monitoring and reporting from National, Regional and District levels; (2) Establish Regional focal persons trained to support Regional and District Officers in procurement and financial management activities; (3) Revive procurement and financial management committees at the Regional and District levels; (4) Provide procurement and financial management staff at headquarters as well as at the Regional and District levels, with adequate accommodation, equipment, logistics and training where appropriate.	MoFA and MoFEP	(1) Review to be completed by end of 2010, (2) focal persons to be in place by end of 2010, (3) committees to be in place by end of 2010, (4) ongoing.	To improve on the data, SRID is to review and update data in the result framework of METASIP.	MoFA-SRID	To be completed by end of June 2012

Source: Compiled by authors from Ghana Joint Sector Review reports.

Note: See acronym list at beginning of document.

2013		
Key Decisions	Implementer	Duration
METASIP Review: (1) Collection of quality data and management, (2) improve institutional coordination, (3) bridging gender disparities, (4) improve implementation structures, and (5) document exit strategy for projects.	PPMED to coordinate implementation	May 2014–present (ongoing)
Review of planning, budgeting and coordination processes in the sector: (1) Adequate time and fund allocation for robust planning and realistic budgeting, (2) training of district staffs on program based budgeting.		–
Private Sector: (1) Coordination among private sector and MoFA, (2) education about opportunities within METASIP, (3) reconstructing link between financial institutions and agriculture value chains, and (4) better engagement of private sector.		–
Decentralization Policy in Relation to METASIP: (1) Low and aging AEAs, (2) integrate METASIP into district medium-term plans.		–


Source: Compiled by authors from 2013 Ghana Joint Sector Review report.

Note: See acronym list at beginning of document.

2.5. Gaps in the JSR Process

The main gaps in the JSR process stem from participation and implementation of the decision points reached at the JSR. Poor participation stems from the organization of the JSR process itself. Participation may be assessed in terms of its scope and depth, where the scope refers to the number of invitees while the depth refers to representation of the various sector stakeholders, contributions, criticisms, or suggestions of the participants. The number of invitees has been increasing steadily (see Figure 2.2).

FIGURE 2.2: NUMBER OF JOINT SECTOR REVIEW PARTICIPANTS FOR VARIOUS YEARS




Source: Compiled by authors from available data JSR participants' lists.

Although increasing the number of participants is good, the mere presence of individuals with a vague knowledge of the sector is not enough. The depth of participation is therefore paramount for a vibrant JSR process. From Figure 2.3, we group the participants of the JSR into state and nonstate representatives. State representatives include those from MoFA and other ministries, departments, and agencies. Nonstate participants are largely from farmer-based organizations, civil society organizations, the private sector, development partners, and members of academia. Figure 2.3 demonstrates that state institutions have the largest representation (68 percent) in the JSR process. Even the remaining 32 percent of representation by nonstate organizations is flooded by the DPs composing more than half of it.

Based on stakeholder interviews, it was clear that stakeholders only come to witness the process (that is, attend the meeting) but do not actively participate in directly addressing issues raised at the review. This may be because invitees are often not tasked with specific areas of focus or specific duties or may not be given enough briefing prior to the JSR. When participants' backgrounds are not properly checked or not related to the sector and for that reason, the person has limited knowledge in the sector or finds the discussion not touching on his/her area of focus, then you can hardly expect any meaningful participation from the person. Azu (2013) also states that there is low inclusion of nonstate actors in the joint sector review. They are physically present in the JSR but have no input in the TOR of prior reviews/studies to feed into the JSR event nor do they have an input into the agenda of the event. As such their participation is weak and their inputs come under 'any other business' for which there is usually little time. This weakens their role in ensuring accountability.

FIGURE 2.3: EXTENT OF REPRESENTATION OF SECTOR STAKEHOLDERS IN 2013 JOINT SECTOR REVIEW



Source: Compiled by authors from 2013 JSR participants' lists.

Note: METASIP Steering Committee is not isolated; instead members are included in their respective institutions.

There also seems to be no clearly established permanent committee for monitoring the implementation of the decisions from the JSR. Since the ad-hoc committee is formed prior to the JSR and it is "dissolved" before the next JSR, there is a lack of continuity in the monitoring of the JSR commitments. Another challenging part of the JSR is that the decisions are reached after the budgetary allocation or approval to the sector, thereby leading to limited funding due to the fact that the implementation cost is unbudgeted in the current financial year in which the JSR was undertaken. These could be the main reasons for the limited evidence of actions on the JSR recommendations as noted in the *aide memoire* of the 2009–2013 JSRs. According to Azu (2013), the JSR appears to be strong in encouraging useful discussions but weak in encouraging action following the discussions. There is little follow-up of the agreements reached in it by the next JSR. There are no sanctions for those who do not meet the commitments they made. As such, the JSR cannot monitor budget compliance. The author stress that it is better to give civil society the mandate. Also Parliamentary oversight is weak due to administrative and political reasons. Again weak dissemination of data (financial, agriculture performance etc.) makes it difficult for NSAs and other stakeholders to do M&E and hold themselves accountable for outcomes. Also there it is difficult to do joint (multi-sectoral) review as joint planning has not yet been achieved. Therefore information availability needs to be institutionalized.

There are also repetitions in the observations and recommendations from year to year as noted in the 2009 *aide memoire* indicating weak follow-up throughout the years, hence only a few of JSR recommendations being implemented. Another challenge is who demands or owns the JSR. Although the strength of the JSR is evidence-based analysis, field trips to ascertain and confirm the reality of the evidence used in the JSR have not been undertaken since 2010. Furthermore, MoFA and other organizations and units of the agriculture sector seem to have limited number of skilled personnel in the technical areas especially in monitoring and evaluation. This suggests that the few staff may be over-stretched due to high workloads, constantly emerging new workloads, and multiple roles assigned to them (see Table 2.5)

TABLE 2.5: STAFFING IN THE MINISTRY OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH OUTFIT

Institution/ Organization	PhD		MSc/MPhil		BSc		Total (2012)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
SRID	0	0	6	3	1	1	7	4
PPMED of MoFA	0	1	7	4	8	5	15	10
Total	0	1	13	7	9	6	22	14

Source: Modified from Dittoh 2013.

2.6. Action Plan to Bridge the Gaps and Best Practices in Implementing JSR

The Ghana JSR initiative is important for tracking the progress of the sector as well as informing policy direction. Therefore the process should be self-sustaining, evidence-based, and useful to stakeholders in the sector and committed to the principles of mutual accountability. While the JSR has been very successful in of being sustained over the years and increased number of participation, there is the need for clear improvement in some areas or inclusion of some missing elements in the process as a means for strengthening the process.

The current scope of participation is adequate but it lacks fair representation across the nation. Therefore, more representation should be offered to stakeholders stationed outside Accra with gender fairness also maintained. Invitees should also be given enough briefing through short communications to determine the direction of the JSR discussions. Participants’ specific tasks and groups should be specified in the invitation letter to enable them to prepare adequately and ensure constructive participation. If invitees attend JSR meetings but fail to participate, it is also the mandate of the chairperson(s) to ensure participation. Discussions should be communicative and understandable to most participants, avoiding domination by a few, in-house discussions and excessive use of jargon or acronyms.

To further strengthen the underlying evidence-base of the JSR, the process must move beyond “data syndrome” to “confirmation.” Meaning, it should not just be based on what has been said or on outdated data but must be based on current data. Realism can only be attained through verification or confirmation. Therefore, there should be random field visits or ground truthing and opinion surveys to confirm the validity and integrity of the data used. However, the data collection process should also be of high quality in order to avoid inconsistencies and obtain data with high reliability.

Again, MoFA should be entrusted with implementation of the JSR decisions in conformity with their mandate, while the development partners provide logistic support. This would also increase ownership and mutual accountability. However, an independent monitoring team could support in the assessment of the progress of implementation of the JSR. Also the quasi ad-hoc committee should be made to serve for a period of years (say three years) to ensure continuity in the monitoring of the JSR decisions and implementation process. There is also the need for capacity building and human resource support. One outcome of the earlier survey by Dittoh (2013) is that the deficit in personnel that MoFA is facing, not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of technical skills and training needs, hinders effective service delivery.

To ensure that inclusiveness and the use of evidence are improved upon in the JSR, it would be useful to have a definite timetable for it that would involve early preparations. Civil society organizations, for example, at workshops conducted during the study suggested that the planning for a May JSR should commence in October annually. This would give the organizers eight months to ensure that all necessary processes are completed. Inclusiveness and participation will be improved on if the overall leadership of the JSR is entrusted to a broader representation of stakeholders like the METASIP Steering Committee. This would allow all key stakeholders to jointly design the agenda of the JSR to reflect topical issues they would want to dialogue on and hence keenly participate in their discussion. Joint designing of the agenda would also allow key stakeholders to articulate viewpoints from their constituencies prior to the JSR.

2.7. Summary

The Ghana JSR process has been very successful in terms of being sustained over the past five years. However, there is the need to make adjustment to some aspects of the process. From the review, two key challenges stand out. First, the poor participation by invitees, and second the ineffective implementation and monitoring of the agreed-upon courses of action. Appropriately, participation could be increased through short communications and briefing of participants prior to the JSR; and also informing participants of their specific tasks and groups. More importantly, effective participation can be increased by having a wider representation of stakeholders, like the METASIP Steering Committee in particular, lead the JSR process with the support of the JSR secretariat. To ensure effectiveness of the output of the JSR, current data as well as verification of implementation through random field visits, ground trothing, or through random survey of key informants in communities of such intended data sources would help.

3. POLICY REVIEW

3.1. Introduction

The agricultural policy stance of modern day Ghana can be traced to colonial and post-independent Ghana. The linkage of agricultural policies to political regimes gives a coherent and concise understanding of agricultural policy development in Ghana.

When the colonial government took control of the Gold Coast and following the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, agricultural policy mainly focused on making the Gold Coast a producer of raw materials for export and an importer of manufactured goods for consumption (Rodney 1984). Following Ghana's independence in 1957, Ghana was faced with the fundamental choice of adopting a unimodal strategy (rapid modernization of the entire agricultural sector) or a bimodal one (accelerated modernization that concentrates resources in a highly commercialized sub-sector, which results in a development pattern on a dualistic size structure of farm units) (Johnston and Kirby 1976). Ghana towed the line of the bimodal dualistic strategy based on modernization development theories that had taken root worldwide. Since then successive government's agricultural policy have been pinned to the export crops with minimal variation in policy. While all governments undertook agricultural modernization in the end, the only difference was whether this was a capitalist or socialist motive.

The Convention People's Party government, which gained independence for Ghana, introduced the First Five-Year Development Plan (1951 to 1956) and the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1959 to 1964). The thrust of these plans encouraged large scale farming under public control in a mechanized setting, which served as a blow to small-scale farmers (Dapaah 1995). An Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) was established to oversee the plan and promote agricultural development. By 1962, the ADC had accumulated a large deficit and was liquidated. Although much less than 1 percent of the nation's local food requirement was produced by these Cooperative Farms, greater part of the Agriculture Budget was allocated to them, perhaps because they offered employment to the strongest supporters of the government.

The next six regimes, which took power successively in Ghana between 1966 and 1992—namely the National Liberation Council led by General Ankrah/Afrifa, Progress Party led by Dr. K. A. Busia, the National Redemption Council (NRC) Supreme Military Council I led by Acheampong, Supreme Military Council II led by Fred Akuffo, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council led by Rawlings, the People's National Party led by Dr. Hilla Limman, and the People's National Defense Council and the National Democratic Congress led by Rawlings—all tended to favor large-scale capital intensive production over small-scale production with little consideration for dealing with agricultural surpluses and raw materials. The only exception was the NRC led by Acheampong, which launched "Operation Feed Yourself," a strategy that promoted local small-scale production even though small-scale farmers were denied access to subsidized farming credit and inputs. During the mid- to late 1990s, agricultural policy in Ghana was characterized by the "project approach" then moved to a sector-wide approach during the 2000s, with FASDEP I and II serving as a framework for agricultural development.

This section provides assessments of the inventory of key existing and emerging policies; the quality of policy planning, implementation, consistency, and balance; and the adequacy of policy coverage as a means to improved agricultural policymaking, implementation, and monitoring in Ghana. Using the "traffic light rating" of red, yellow, and green, we assess six key policy dimensions of national policies based on the level of

attention needed to improve their effectiveness. A green rating implies that the component is realized to a sufficient degree, and additional attention is not required. A yellow rating means that the conditions required to achieve the component are partially achieved, but additional attention is required. A red rating means that significant attention is needed to ensure the component is achieved.

3.2. Inventory of Existing and Emerging Policies

There have been a number of agricultural sector policies or related policies that existed prior to the introduction of Ghana's METASIP. Some of the major policies that have had some bearing on agriculture include the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Financial Sector Investment Programme (FINSAP) of the early 1990s, the Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme (MTADP) (1991–2000), and the economy-wide Vision 2020 Framework of the mid-1990s. Under the MTADP, a number of agricultural projects were implemented, which included the National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) (1991–1999), National Agricultural Extension Project (NAEP) (1992–2000), Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (ASAC) (1992–1999), National Livestock Services Project (NLSP) (1993–1999), and Agricultural Subsector Investment Project (ASIP) (1994–2000).

The MTADP was followed with the Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy (AAGDS) (1996 to 2000) and the Agriculture Services Sector Investment Programme (AgSSIP) (2002 and 2006) under which the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) I and FASDEP II were developed based on a broad consultative process. The objectives of FASDEP II are aligned to the CAADP pillars. FASDEP II objectives were also in line with the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) (2003–2005), the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) (2006–2009) and the most current April 2014 Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda II (GSDA II) (2014–2017), all of which were developed under the watch of Ghana's National Development Planning Commission (NDPC).


A new encouraging development emerging from the most recent 2014 Joint Sector Review, is that MoFA has agreed to develop a comprehensive national agricultural policy framework to identify and focus on policy and institutional reform actions that enhance the achievement of growth and development results. It will incorporate the above-mentioned strategic national agendas with all existing policy reform initiatives of the development partners (such as the New Alliance), while ensuring adequate input from the private sector and civil society. This agricultural policy framework will be created on three-year rolling basis and the status of reform implementation will be reported on a quarterly basis to senior MoFA management.

Another positive change in the policy landscape is that MoFA agreed in June 2014 to expand beyond the New Alliance policy activity and require private sector participation through the MoFA Post-Harvest Committee. This is important because the government has not adequately addressed the private sector's concerns with minimum price setting and related marketing activities of the national food buffer stock company (NAFCO). The impact of NAFCO will be assessed and efforts made to align its activities and investments with the best market-oriented solutions that contribute to food security (a major FASDEP and METASIP objective), market stabilization, and income protection of smallholder farmers. The aim is to accomplish this on a more market and private-sector friendly basis.

Following the development of FASDEP II, NEPAD supported Ghana through the CAADP process (in collaboration with sector development partners) to develop its National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP). This was the Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) for implementing FASDEP II.

However, after the development of the METASIP, some program initiatives have also emerged or been completed; some of these initiatives were being concurrently prepared alongside and, in some cases, in support of the METASIP. These include the Fertilizer and Seed Policy, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for Accelerated Development Policy, the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement, the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, and others.¹ In particular, the government initiated the design of the Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (GASIP) as a way to operationalize the METASIP, together with the DPs and other country partners. In April 2014, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) approved substantial funding to finance a component of GASIP. The government seeks to improve the management of the sector by: (1) enhancing the focus on country priorities through a clear results matrix; (2) further aligning donor-financed programs with these priorities; and (3) improving planning and budgeting by harnessing resources from the government, DPs, and the private sector. (See Figure 3.1.)

FIGURE 3.1: PRE- AND POST-METASIP PROGRAMS AND OTHER INITIATIVES



Source: Authors' construction.

Note: See acronym list at the beginning of this document.

3.3. Quality of Policy Planning and Execution

Policy planning and execution must be evidence-based and involves an in-depth understanding of agricultural systems. Sensitization as well as collaboration among sector stakeholders should also enhance the quality of policy planning and execution. The quality of policy planning and execution has multiple dimensions that should lead to an increased sense of ownership of policies; limited risk associated with project implementation; better and easy strategies of implementation, budgeting, and financing; and limited time overruns in implementation.

Stakeholders generally perceived that the quality of policy planning, implementation, and monitoring is good since policy planning and execution follows a consultative and collaborative process. Many of the stakeholders cited the design of FASDEP II as an example of such consultative processes, although some were of the view that there is still opportunity to improve the process. As similarly noted by Azu (2013), stakeholders perceived that the planning and budget process used by MoFA is not "results oriented," making it difficult to monitor the relationship between expenditure and outputs.

¹ While the METASIP anticipated a partnership with the private sector, the initiation of the New Alliance provided an additional avenue to deepen the collaboration between the government and the private sector.

Despite the overlapping view on stakeholder involvement in policy design and implementation, there was a general consensus on the extent to which policies define measurable targets that can be tracked. The general view was that policies usually have baselines for benchmarking progress. Therefore the targets are set based on these benchmarks. For example, METASIP has a set of performance measures that are organized according to the framework's six objectives. Also inherent in the benchmarks are evaluation measures. Thus the benchmarks form the basis for tracking and evaluating progress. Nonetheless, some of the baseline measures are not provided in the METASIP. Additionally, some of the target set appears unrealistic and are not easily measurable (Dittoh 2013; Azu 2013). The policies themselves also do not specify any definitive review approach or mechanisms for reviewing the policy.

For instance, although the review of FASDEP I culminated in the development of FASDEP II, the review was mainly prompted by the lack of ownership due to poor participation and consultation—not by any specified review process in the policy itself (MoFA 2006). Also, as noted by MoFA (2013d), 67 percent of indicators had no baseline, 7 percent had no targets, and 42 percent were not stated neutrally. Again, there is not a defined policy reform process in support of METASIP objectives. Lack of accurate and reliable data is another challenge affecting the quality of policy planning and evaluation, which was rated as red in the evaluation.

3.4. Consistency of Policy Mix

Existing as well as emerging policies are in harmony with each other (Africa Lead 2013). Usually, emerging policies are intended to support or bridge existing policy gaps, but some, such as the Fertilizer and Seed Policy, do not have supporting implementation plans. This suggests that implementation of such plans may be rooted in the METASIP, which creates challenges in terms of coordination of the programs and duplication of efforts. Also, among METASIP's objectives is institutional coordination, however, there is limited inter- and intra-ministerial coordination as well decentralization of METASIP implementation programs in the districts (MoFA 2013d). But, overall, policies complement each other in attaining set objectives and targets. Therefore, this aspect of policies in the sector could be rated as Yellow.

3.5. Alignment of Emerging Policies with Ghana's NAIP (METASIP)

Generally, all existing and emerging policies in the agricultural sector and even some that are indirectly related to agriculture (such as the ICT4ADP and Ghana Irrigation Development Policies) are directed to the successful implementation of the METASIP. This is mainly because emerging policies such as the Fertilizer and Seed Policy and even the New Alliance take their roots from gaps in the METASIP or FASDEP II. According to the *METASIP Mid-term Review Report*, which examined 61 projects using a three-point Likert scale, 24 projects were noted to have a low level of alignment to METASIP, 30 projects a medium level, and seven a high level. These projects are the West Africa Agriculture Productivity Programme, Integrated Coastal Fisheries Management and Governance Programme, Export Marketing and Quality Awareness Programme, Cashew Development Project, AGRA Agricultural Value Chain Mentorship Project, USAID Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement (ADVANCE) Project, and Afram Plains Agricultural Development Project. Stakeholders in the sector also showed similar perception with most generally agreeing that emerging policies are substantially in alignment with METASIP implementation. However, there was emphasis on continuous assessment of emerging policies to ensure alignment. With minimal work required, this could be rated as green.

3.6. Policy Implementation Status


The policy implementation process is characterized by a limited degree of predictability and transparency due to capacity constraints as well as financial limitations (Dittoh 2013). MoFA and other organizational units in the agriculture sector have limited number of staff especially at the district levels. For instance, in most districts the Agricultural Extension Agent (AEA) to farmer ratio is still as high as 1:1,500 (MoFA 2010a). The ideal rate is one agent for every 400 farmers.

Dittoh (2013) pointed out that although MoFA is the lead ministry in the agricultural sector, it does not have the capacity and the required skills to implement some of the METASIP programs, such as Programme 2 (Improved Growth in Incomes), Programme 3 (Increased Competitiveness), and Programme 5 (Science and Technology Applied to Food and Agriculture). This was further confirmed by the stakeholders who were interviewed in this study. Again, using the efficiency of policy implementation benchmark developed by MoFA, the level of efficiency of implementation of the ministry's policy is declining (see Figure 3.2). According to MoFA (2014), efficiency of the ministry is declining at the rate of 1.22 percent per year, and the ministry cannot afford to be ineffective and inefficient when the order of the day is "value for money." This further illustrates the need to place red alert on policy implementation.

In terms of monitoring the status of implementation, only a few staff members had technical ability in 2009, as articulated in the 2009 MoFA M&E evaluation report (Dittoh 2013). Although MoFA has received some training since then, many stakeholders perceive the M&E system to be largely nonfunctional in terms of significantly influencing strategic planning and modification of policies and programs (Dittoh 2013).

According to Azu (2013), some stakeholders believe that agriculture is not a priority for the Finance Ministry, as evidenced by its more visible outputs on road construction and health. This contributes to a late (or nonexistent) release of funds compared to other sectors, which makes it difficult or impossible for MoFA to deliver on set targets. Where funds are provided, political considerations and a lack of policy and budget discipline—that is, the inability to "stick to plan"—is usually the main problem (Azu 2013). There is an ongoing disconnect between sector plans and available resources, with the situation becoming worse when there are cash flow difficulties. In spite of these challenges and with the support of development partners, MoFA (2013d) found that most of the projects completed or ongoing in the life of the METASIP are aligned with its core objectives. This implies that some progress is being made, and the area is therefore given a yellow rating.

FIGURE 3.2: TRENDS IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPLEMENTATION EFFICIENCY RATIO



Source: Regional agricultural development unit reports (MoFA 2014).

3.7. Meeting Policy Commitment under the New Alliance (NA) Cooperation Framework

Under the New Alliance, the government's policy commitments are broadly aimed at increasing the use of improved inputs and encouraging investment in the sector. The increase in investment is to be encouraged by making the investment climate more secure and making the sector's policy process more transparent and inclusive. Fifteen policy actions were committed to within seven broad areas. Twelve of these commitments were due by June 2014 while three are at a later date. Of the twelve due in June, only four were completed while some progress has been made in achieving the remaining eight. Some progress has been made in achieving the commitments that are due after June 2014, and the overall area was rated yellow. The seven broad areas are discussed below and highlighted in Table 3.1.

1. Developing regulations to implement the new seed law
 - Of the three policy actions under the first broad area, one was already in place and did not need to be improved on. This is the action on standards for seed classification. This action is therefore regarded as completed. Some progress has been achieved in the other two policy actions as indicated in Table 3.1. In 2012, the regulations had been completed and presented to Parliament, however, they did not meet the 21-day requirement to become law before Parliament went on recess. The process for making them a law was restarted.
 - Already, the new select committee has been given the opportunity to review the regulations: their comments have been incorporated and the AGs Department has submitted it for approval by MoFA for laying in Parliament. Progress in this area is also shown by the June 2014 official launch of the new Fertilizer and Seed Policy, which was completed in 2013, and the inauguration of the seed councils. However, the achievement of this action area is behind schedule by one year as it was targeted for completion by June 2013.
2. Developing a new inputs policy for fertilizer and seed
 - As indicated above, the Fertilizer and Seed Policy was officially launched in June 2014 but completed in 2013. Further work is ongoing to clarify the roles for various stakeholders. This area is noted as having experienced some progress.
3. Creating a database of suitable land for investors
 - This action area is to be achieved through the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project (GCAP). However, the project preparation took many years longer than expected. It was finally approved by Parliament on August 16, 2012, and became effective on the April 8, 2013. In 2013, the Project Implementation Manual (PIM) was developed, and sensitization workshops with communities and farmers in northern Ghana on land database were held. Currently, consultants have been engaged to develop a system to establish the land bank, to be completed in September 2014. This action is rated as having experienced some progress compared to last year.
4. Developing a pilot lease model for land
 - Consultants have also been engaged to develop a system to establish the lease agreement and are to submit their report by September 2014. We note that some progress has occurred on this policy action.

5. Establishing clear procedures for channeling investments
 - A firm (Monitor/Deloitte Group) has been engaged to review, develop, and implement capacity building for the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) and the Agribusiness Division of PPMED. We also note that some progress has occurred on this policy action.
6. Completing a new Ghana Agricultural Production Survey
 - This was piloted in two phases: the initial pilot in 2011–2012 and the consolidation in 20 districts in 2012–2013. The pilot data was released October 8, 2012, and the second phase was completed in April 2013. Scaling up from the pilot and actual implementation is the third phase, and up to 60 districts will be reached. The current scaling up will be possible only for the minor season, so it will be completed in the major season of 2015. The plan is then to scale up to 120 districts and finally to the total 260 districts nationwide.
7. Making the post-harvest committee more inclusive
 - This was to be achieved by appointing private sector representatives of key grain value chains to the MoFA Post-Harvest Committee. This action was completed on September 13, 2012.

TABLE 3.1: UPDATE ON THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY COMMITMENTS

Objective	Framework Policy Actions	Date Due	Progress Made	Traffic Light Rating
A. To establish policy that enables the private sector to develop commercialize and use improved inputs to increase smallholder productivity and incomes	1. Regulations developed to implement the new seed law, specifically:			
	Seed registry system established.	June 2013	The law requires that the ministry compile a register of plant varieties. A catalogue is being developed by the Crop Services Division. In the seed regulations, there is also a registry on breeder seed, foundation seed, certified seed, seed producers, and seed distributors.	
	Protocols for variety testing, release and registration, authorization to conduct field inspections, seed sampling, and seed testing developed.	June 2013	Protocols are to be established where they were absent and existing ones revised to conform to the ECOWAS harmonized seed regulations. This is ongoing.	
	Standards for seed classification and certification established.	June 2013	The standards for seed classification and certification exist as before the law and were not revised because they were considered adequate.	
	2. New agricultural input policy for fertilizer and certified seed use developed that includes:		The fertilizer policy facilitated by PPRSD and the seed policy facilitated by CSD have been completed and approved by the Cabinet in 2013.	
	Clearly defined role of government in fertilizer and seed marketing;	December 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An action plan is being developed to support implementation and clarify roles. The regulatory aspects are being implemented. Activities such as attracting investment and research into those sectors will be supported by the action plan 	
	Clearly defined role of government's CSIR and Grains & Legumes Board	December 2013		
	Defined role of private sector in breeding.	December 2013		
B. To create a secure investment climate for investors by reducing transaction costs and risks	3. Database of suitable land for investors established (1000 ha registered by 2013):		This objective is to be achieved by the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project (GCAP), which became effective on April 8, 2013. The Project Implementation Manual (PIM) has been developed. Consultants have been engaged to develop a system to establish the land bank. Consultancy to be completed by September 2014.	
	1,000 ha registered	December 2013		
	4,500 ha registered	December 2014		
	10,000 ha registered	December 2015		
	4. Pilot model lease agreements for 5,000 ha of land in database established.	December 2015	Consultants engaged to develop a system to establish the lease agreement. Consultancy to be completed by September.	
	5. Clear procedures to channel investor interest (including that related to value-added agricultural processing) to appropriate agencies completed.	December 2013	A firm (Monitor/Deloitte Group) has been engaged to review and develop capacity building for GIPC and the Agribusiness Division of PPMD to carry out this action to facilitate investor interest.	

Objective	Framework Policy Actions	Date Due	Progress Made	Traffic Light Rating
C. To support transparent, inclusive evidence -based policy formulation process based on quality data and sound evidence that leads to increased investment in agriculture	6. New Ghana Agricultural Production Survey (GAPS) stood up			
	Piloted data release	July 2012	The pilot data was released October 8, 2012	
	2nd phase completed	September 2013	The second phase was completed April 2013	
	New national agriculture survey data released	May 2014	Planning has commenced for the scaling of activities beyond the geographical coverage of the second phase.	
	7. Private sector representatives of key grain value chains appointed to the MoFA Post Harvest Committee.	December 2013	Policy action met on September 13, 2012.	

Source: MoFA.










3.8. Adequacy of Policy Coverage

Ghana has extensive policies that cover multiple aspects of the METASIP (Africa Lead 2013). According to a MoFA study (2013d), there are 43 development issues under FASDEP that need to be addressed in order to achieve the targets set for the sector. These issues are addressed through the 21 METASIP components assessed. The FASDEP II and its implementation plans thus cover all sectors of Ghana's agriculture and many of the areas under the subsectors. Stakeholders also agreed that the coverage of policy is adequate. However, what may be required is the development of legislative instruments and by-laws to guide, regulate, and operationalize the implementation of some of the sector policies. In 2013, the government initiated the design of the GASIP as a contemporary and more effective way of operationalizing key objectives of the METASIP, together with the DPs and other country partners. Policy coverage is rated as yellow.

3.9. Summary

Ghana's policy process has been evolving and improving. Although there is some level of evidence-based planning, a lack of up-to-date data proves a challenge. The review also showed that financing and human resource constraints impede effective implementation of the policies. Thus, while most dimensions of the policy process are adequate and require minimal attention, the quality of policy planning and execution requires serious and critical attention to improve the situation. MoFA as a lead ministry is therefore expected to take up the challenge and act on it appropriately. Building on what began in 2014, two new encouraging activities will continue to improve the agriculture policy environment. One is the completion of GASIP, which may be the new agricultural strategic framework following the end of the METASIP in 2015. GASIP should be more focused and have a better alignment between planning, resource allocation, and implementation than the METASIP and thereby address some of the concerns raised by the METASIP. The second development is a commitment to operationalize a single comprehensive national agricultural policy framework that is monitored closely and reported on a quarterly basis to everyone in the country. (See Table 3.2.)

TABLE 3.2: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT OF POLICY DIMENSIONS IN GHANA

Policy Dimension	Traffic Light Rating		
			
Quality of policy planning and execution			
Consistency of policy mix			
Alignment of policies with Ghana's NAIP (METASIP)			
Policy implementation status			
Meeting of policy commitment under the New Alliance Cooperation framework			
Adequacy of policy coverage			

Source: Authors.

Note: Red indicates that the dimension requires a considerable level of attention to ensure realization; yellow indicates mixed progress, meaning that the objective is partially achieved, but additional attention is required; and green indicates that the dimension has been achieved to a sufficient degree, and additional attention is not necessary.

4. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

4.1. Introduction

Agricultural institutions are fundamental to rural development and attainment of agricultural development goals. Poor and inefficient institutions lead to market imperfections and failure. Inefficient institutions also increase transaction cost associated with agricultural policy formulation and implementation. This section is therefore dedicated to reviewing the landscape and capacity of agricultural institutions with respect to their alignment with the needs for successful implementation of Ghana's METASIP and Cooperation agreements as well as gaps and adjustments needed using the traffic light rating suggested in section three based on stakeholder interviews and existing literature.

4.2. Institutional Landscape of NAIP (METASIP)


Ghana's NAIP is inconsonance with CAADP vision, values and principles and covers a broad spectrum of sectors and subsectors of agriculture. The alignment of the plan with Ghana's CAADP commitments is cardinal to successful implementation of the METASIP. Ghana's NAIP formulation process brought some key stakeholders to participate in its formulation.

According to MoFA (2010b), the stakeholder groups engaged in the formulation of the METASIP included sector related ministries, researchers, NGOs, private sector operators along the value chains (input suppliers, processors, traders, exporters, financial institutions, warehouses operators, transporters), academia, regional and district level officers of MoFA. Other stakeholders consulted were civil society organizations, Parliamentary Select Committee on Agriculture and Cocoa Affairs and DPs. As shown in Figure 4.1, the broad based institutions involved in the formulation of the METASIP were mainly state institutions and nonstate actors, with MoFA as the lead state institution.

Other state institutions that supported the process were the NDPC and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP). Nonstate actors that actively participated in the formulation of the METASIP were the international nongovernmental organizations mainly IFPRI and FAO which supported in benchmarking and stocktaking analysis, development partners or donors through their participation in the METASIP Steering Committee, CSOs, academia, private-sector organizations, and farmer-based organizations.

In terms of implementation of the sector plan, MoFA through its existing structures are to spearhead the implementation with support from other MDAs and stakeholder organizations as well as the NDPC. Where areas of implementation fall beyond the ambit of MoFA, the specific ministry involved is notified. For instance, the ministry of roads and highways support with road construction. But of course farmers and the private sector are those involved in direct operationalization of the plan.

FIGURE 4.1: KEY INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF GHANA'S NAIP



Source: Authors.

Note: See acronym list at the beginning of this document.

4.3. Coordination within Institutions

The success of implementation of agricultural policies largely depends on effective collaboration between various stakeholders. Ineffective coordination is rooted in ministerial structures through poor communication strategy and project planning. This continued weakness in intra-and inter-ministerial coordination manifest in duplication and non-prudent use of resources. Therefore, Programme Six (6) of the METASIP has the target of improving institutional coordination. This program area although is the most important aspect for pooling resources and rallying support for METASIP implementation, over the years, this appears to be highly relegated to the background.

This has led to poor performance of programs and projects mainly due to ineffective institutional partnering and coordination (MoFA 2014b). As noted by Dittoh (2013), there is also very little organized knowledge management and sharing mechanisms within the Ministries' set up. In many cases the linkages between most of these organizations and institutions are very weak and many departments and institutions tend to prefer to work in isolation. Coordination in policy implementation within and among ministries therefore deserves utmost attention. Although the agricultural sector in Ghana is very wide covering several MDAs and non-MDAs, there is the need for effective partnering, collaboration and coordination among MDAs.

Institutions and agencies within MoFA need to partner and network with those outside MoFA to be able to successfully implement the policy plans. Even though the ASWG and the NDPC have bridged the gap in some ways, there is still a significant amount of work to be done to create new linkages if necessary and strengthen existing linkages across sectors and among MDAs. Regular meetings between directorates, agencies and

others within and outside MoFA such as transport, Science and environment and the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) will help bridge the gap. Also, there should be programs designed to ensure ministerial coordination. As noted in the 2013 JSR draft report, before then, no project was aligned to ministerial coordination MoFA (2013a). This area of agricultural institutions therefore requires critical attention and could be rated as Red.

4.4. Participation of Nonstate Actors in Policy and Program Formulation

Participation of nonstate actors during the design of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which had several cross-cutting policies, was very limited, leading to the payment of economic cost of adjustment after the SAP. Since that period agricultural policy design has tried to gain broad based participation from stakeholders across the sector as a means to instill a sense of ownership of policies among stakeholders, even though many stakeholders think the process (particularly FASDEP I and METASIP development) were still not fully open to nonstate actors. But the key question is: are there institutional structures that allow nonstate actors to participate in policy and program formulation?

Institutional structures that exist to ensure effective participation are weak. These weak structures stem from weak linkages and coordination among state and nonstate actors in the sector. Although the civil society and other nonstate actors are members of the METASIP Steering Committee, the effectiveness of their use of this platform is low due to some organizational challenges in both the ministry and stakeholders' institutions. Achieving successful implementation of sector policies and programs requires strong participation of nonstate actors who are the people to operationalize the policies and programs. Therefore it is very important to build institutional structures to enhance participation by nonstate actors. Nonstate actors should see their participation in policy making as both a right and a national duty. In this way, there should be concerted communication strategy for rebranding the sector's policy formulation process. There should also be capacity building workshops to enhance the participation capacity of nonstate actors that lack the capacity to effectively participate in policy formulation. The status of participation is thus rated as Yellow.

But what will improve the situation going forward is the current effort to strengthen the Agricultural Public Private Dialogue Forum (APPDF) initiated by PEF in 2010 to provide a structured and formal mechanism for a healthy dialogue between Government represented by MoFA and other organizations that represent stakeholders along many different value chains. These stakeholders include farmer based organizations, private sector and civil society organizations along with DPs. Two donors—the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and USAID—are providing renewed support. MoFA senior management endorsed APPDF at the 2014 JSR Business Meeting, which is an encouraging sign of their interest and support.

Participation at the recent 2014 JSR approached 170 people—far more than any other JSR. As a result, it was more inclusive and there was a larger proportion of nongovernmental people. It provided an opportunity for the farming community to let MoFA management know its concerns about the lack of any announcement about the 2014 fertilizer subsidy. Their concerns were voiced in the plenary and break-out sessions, demanding a response and explanation from the ministry.

4.5. Participation of Nonstate Actors in Policy and Program Implementation

Through interviews with stakeholders, it was made clear that implementation of the sector policy is the sole responsibility of the sector ministries, departments and agencies, with very minimal support from nonstate actors. This may be due to failure of the METASIP in specifying implementation roles of the various nonstate actors (Dittoh 2013). Leadership by nonstate actors in implementation can be said to be virtually minimal; except for DPs or DP projects aligned to the sector plan, most implementation is pursued by MoFA through its sub-units. While nonstate actors are invited to participate in several projects, it is not common to find substantive projects led by nonstate actors like civil society organizations and farmers unions. However, according to the METASIP mid-term Review report, the implementation of at least 11 of the 61 projects related to METASIP was led by the private sector.

Nonstate actors including farmers unions and civil society organizations would be encouraged by having clear and substantive roles to play in the achievement of the goals in the sector's investment plan. With involvement of nonstate actors in project implementation and the leadership of some projects by the private sector, participation in implementation by NSA is therefore rated as yellow. Again, what should improve the role of nonstate actors in policy implementation is their participation in an inclusive consultative process to create, monitor, and report quarterly on a three-year rolling national agriculture policy framework as agreed to in the 2014 JSR Business Meeting. In addition, USAID is providing assistance to boost the capacity of the METASIP Steering Committee, its Secretariat, and committee members to be more effective in leading the sector with more capable participants.

4.6. Institutional Alignment with NAIP and Institutional Gaps

There was a general agreement that the number of existing institutions is enough for successful implementation of the METASIP. However, according to the Ghana CAADP Post Compact Technical Review Report, the lack of clarity on how program implementation will be aligned with relevant agencies to ensure proper sequencing poses an immense challenge to successful implementation of the plan (ECOWAS 2010). It is stressed that clear agreements should be established to specify the roles and responsibilities for each party. Institutional realignment may be required. Therefore the status of alignment of METASIP with existing institutions needs to be given a yellow rating.

4.7. Institutional Implementation Capacity

As indicated above, Dittoh (2013) found that MoFA does not have the capacity or the required skills to implement Programmes 2, 3, and 5. Other ministries—such as Trade and Industry, and Environment, Science and Technology—should lead Programs 3 and 5, respectively. MoFA also needs support in achieving Programme 6 (Improved Institutional Coordination), as it often relies on the NDPC outfit to undertake inter-ministerial stakeholder discussions.

Also, the implementing institutions lack technical skills to monitor and evaluate some aspects of the NAIP (Dittoh 2013). The author stressed that there is very low capacity for monitoring and evaluation at the district level of MoFA where monitoring and evaluation are critical to the success of implementation, while all the expertise is centralized at the regional and head office. This finding supports that of Africa Lead (2013) that

policy implementation suffers from capacity constraints, particularly in monitoring and evaluation. In addition to the capacity challenge, there is frequently a lack of funds to conduct monitoring and evaluation activities.


Besides the lack of technical skills, the low number of staff at the institutions was also frequently mentioned. Azu (2013) noted that MoFA staff is overstretched. Thus the personnel who are capable of ensuring the delivery of the mandates is so overstretched that their ability to deliver is greatly constrained (Dittoh, 2013). For instance, the high farmer to extension ratio (1:1500) and high attrition rate of MoFA staff in the district was mentioned. Again as in 2010, MoFA had 60.4 percent (6,603) of the needed staff members, but the human resources database suggests that they needed 10,754 staff members to fulfill the needs of METASIP. There is also a mismatch of existing staff capacities and their roles in the 2010 JSR report. With a continuous hiring freeze in the public sector, the situation may have worsened. But, according to MoFA's 2012 Annual Progress Report, it has undertaken capacity building activities to address these issues, including training 116 staff members overseas. Also, between 2008 and 2012, there have been some numbers of domestic training in Ghana's local universities and tertiary institutions, as well as different in-service training of 146,033 employees.

This suggests that there is an ongoing capacity building effort. However, issues that need to be addressed include the scope and quality of training—that is, whether people are trained in what they are supposed to do or whether people are trained to fill the capacity gaps required for implementation of METASIP. Again, since 2010, there has been gradual decline in the number of staff being trained (Figure 4.2).

METASIP has no operational workplan that is currently being used (Azu 2013). There are also no written operational guidelines with respect to how to achieve policy and strategy coherence in the food and agriculture sector. Logistics to work are reducing at all levels, and motivation is very low. Extension personnel in most districts, for example, did not receive any funds for fuel for most of 2012. Again the low involvement of other ministries in the design of the METASIP has led to low ownership and commitment on their part. The METASIP Steering Committee (MSC), charged to oversee the implementation of the METASIP, has grown frustrated by the actions, inactions, and interference of the sector's political leadership (Dittoh 2013).

MSC members have virtually no evidence-based information to work with. The well-designed M&E system is merely a design because there is hardly any M&E data to evaluate. In any case, over the years, the top management of the agriculture sector has not shown much interest in M&E information. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is the government's research organization; it has a mandate to generate research information to help ministries and others to execute government policies. However, according Dittoh (2013), the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology did not give any research funds to the CSIR for all of 2012. Therefore, institutional implementation capacity is rated as yellow.

FIGURE 4.2: DOMESTIC TRAINING OF MINISTRY OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE STAFF



Source: Authors' graph from MoFA (2014) data.

4.8. Coordination among Development Partners

In recent years, development partners (DPs) have made progress in terms of coordinating their activities. This is evidenced by a compilation of projects in a DP matrix, carrying out of joint missions and the development of a joint action plan. However, it is not common for DPs to share workplans with each other or pool technical capacities. In terms of communication, a monthly meeting of DPs prior to the Agriculture Sector Working Group (ASWG) meeting is used to share knowledge and deliberate on important issues. The monthly ASWG has also been a good way to encourage information sharing and consensus building.

At times, some of the programs pursued by DPs have limited synergy with the government's top priorities. While MoFA (2013d) found that most projects were largely aligned to the METASIP, it is common that, in a given year or period, the key priorities of the projects often are not the same as those of the government. Some stakeholders hold the view that much more progress would be achieved in the sector if the top priorities of all stakeholders (the government, DPs, civil society, and farmer organizations) were the same annually. This is especially important to determine where available technical and financial resources are directed.

Improved alignment of top priorities would sharpen the impacts of the various technical and financial resources, which often appear to be widely spread over several areas annually. Coordination among development partners is thus rated as yellow. However, the ASWG is still one of the best sector working groups in the country; in 2014, the group will hire a full-time staff member to enhance coordination as well as interaction with MoFA in particular.










4.9. Summary

The section looked at the institutional landscape and environment for policy formulation in Ghana. It closes with a discussion on the capacity of institutions to implement the METASIP as well the extent of coordination

within and between key players in the sector. We rate the various components of institutions or institutional characteristics in Ghana based on stakeholder interviews and existing literature. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the ratings for the various components.

Several aspects of the shortcomings have been recognized, and there appears to be more willingness and support now to address these issues. Institutionalizing JSR action plans at the end of each JSR meeting and formalizing the process to implement it will hold actors accountable for achievements. This is an example of improvements we can anticipate over the next year.

TABLE 4.1: SUMMARY OF RATINGS OF INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS IN GHANA

Policy Dimension	Traffic Light Rating		
			
Coordination within state/government institutions			
Participation of nonstate actors in policy and program formulation			
Participation of nonstate actors in policy and program implementation			
Institutional alignment with NAIP and institutional gaps			
Institutional implementation capacity			
Coordination among development partners			

Note: Red indicates that the dimension requires a considerable level of attention to ensure realization; yellow indicates mixed progress, meaning that the objective is partially achieved, but additional attention is required; and green indicates that the dimension has been achieved to a sufficient degree, and additional attention is not necessary.

5. REVIEW OF KEY FINANCIAL AND NONFINANCIAL COMMITMENTS

5.1. Introduction

For Ghana to attain its target of 6 percent agriculture sector growth by 2015, much investment needs to be made. Financial and non-financial commitments stand crucial in the implementation of its sector plan and the achievement of the needed investment to propel the growth of the sector. This fifth section is therefore dedicated to highlighting some of the key commitments by stakeholders in the sector and assessing progress made in meeting the commitments.

5.2. Key Financial and Nonfinancial Commitments by the Government

5.2.1. Inventory of Government Budget and Other Financial Commitments

The Government of Ghana (GoG) through various policies, investment plans and cooperation agreements made several financial and non-financial commitments. Key among these financial commitments by government can broadly be seen through the METASIP. The total funding commitment of the METASIP at its launch in 2010 was Ghanaian cedis (GHC) 1,532.4 million for the period, 2011–2015. This commitment did not consider existing commitments to recurrent costs and investments for ongoing programs; operational costs such as personal emoluments and administration of the implementing agencies; effects of inflation and depreciation of the cedi against the major foreign currencies; and investment in infrastructure such as power, water, and communications required to ensure efficient operation of the private sector within the government's market-oriented policy framework, although there was funding gap (MoFA 2013). This funding commitment covers the six program areas of METASIP. In the study, we assessed government's commitments from 2011–2013 since government is expected to have met this funding commitment by our study period.

TABLE 5.1: GOVERNMENT METASIP FUNDING COMMITMENT AND EXPENDITURE (GHC MILLION)

Programme/Component	Total Commitment Due by Current Review Period (2011–2013)	Progress by Current Review Period (Expenditures to 2013)	Commitment Gap/Excess (GHC million)
Programme 1: Food Security and Emergency Preparedness	374.9	306.5	-68.4
Programme 2: Increased Growth in Incomes	560.0	68.9	-491.1
Programme 3: Increased Competitiveness and Enhanced Integration into Domestic and International Markets	14.6	18.4	3.8
Programme 4: Sustainable Management of Land and Environment	15.0	19.8	4.8
Programme 5: Science and Technology Applied in Food and Agricultural Development	31.5	30.7	-0.8
Programme 6: Enhanced Institutional Coordination	6.8	121.2	114.4
Total METASIP	1002.8	565.6	-437.2

Source: Authors' compilation using data from MoFA.

As shown in Table 5.1, the government has been able to meet three of the commitments while the other three have not been met. While Programme 1 and Programme 5 have not been met and thus have commitment gaps, other programs have been established and overfunded. Table A1.6 contains detailed commitment and expenditure figures. The reasons for the underfunding and overfunding may perhaps originate from the manner budgets are prepared and the difficulty of assigning expenditure to specific commodities, as noted by Azu (2013). Government expenditure to the sector must be aligned to its commitments since doing so is a key way to ensure that financing decision patterns are contributing to the achievement of overall sector target sets. It should however be noted that the government had intended to source funding for the METASIP from both internal and external sources. With the gap between commitments and expenditure to date, it is clear that more effort is required in terms of securing the required funds to implement the METASIP.

5.2.2. Inventory of Government Nonfinancial and Policy Commitments

The government also made a number of nonfinancial commitments under the METASIP. These commitments are to be achieved annually or semiannually; they generally fall under 38 main objective sets or commitments.² (See Table 5.2.) From our review, a total of three commitments have been met annually, based on the baseline data of 2008, 21 partially met, and 13 have not yet been started. In Programme 1, out of the 12 commitments, none have been fully met yet. Under Programme 2, of the 12 commitments, two-thirds have been partially met, with one-third yet to start. Those commitments with which implementation is yet to start include developing eight new commercially viable products annually and selecting two commodities in each agro-ecological zone for pilot value chain development.

In Programme 3, while two of the commitments have partially been achieved—namely, a 50 percent increase in marketed output of smallholder farmers and a 50 percent increase of export of all nontraditional crops—making functional grading and standardization systems for agricultural commodities are yet to be implemented. Commitments under Programme 4 to review all existing laws, policies, and regulations by 2011 and build institutional capacity in sustainable management of land and dissemination of technologies—are yet to be implemented. In Programme 5, while two of the commitments saw a 25 percent increase—adoption of technologies along the value chain and enactment of two laws annually to enhance application of biotechnology—agricultural technology has not increased. Programme 6 has two commitments fully met while four are partially being met. Those key commitments fully met are the establishment of joint platform for collaboration between MoFA and other MDAs, and a strengthening of MoFA and DP collaboration.

From this discussion, what is apparent is that much is required to meeting the target sets. While the aggregate figures suggest reasonable progress, the numbers conceal a much more complex and mixed picture, with notable successes in Programmes 1, 2, and 6. Although the timeframe for achieving the targets under METASIP is 2015, it is not certain all the targets will be reached by the deadline. This notwithstanding, increased government support in the form of financial commitment to the sector, capacity building, and increased collaboration may be key to meeting nonfinancial commitments.

² These are mainly the targets in the METASIP that were expressed numerically—some targets did not have specific numeric values. It should be noted that the METASIP's targets included intermediate as well as output targets. They are included here as they are clear commitments made by the government.

TABLE 5.2: GOVERNMENT METASIP NONFINANCIAL COMMITMENTS

Program	Number of Key Commitments/ Objectives	Number of Key Commitments Fully Achieved	Number of Key Commitments Partially Achieved	Number of Key Commitments Not Yet Implemented
1	12	0	12	0
2	12	0	8	4
3	3	0	2	1
4	2	0	0	2
5	3	0	2	1
6	6	2	4	0
Total	38	3	27	8

Source: Authors' compilation.

5.3. Commitments by Nonstate Actors (NSAs)

Through the CAADP New Alliance framework, the private sector, farmers, politicians, and civil society organizations have made some commitments as a means to contribute to the attainment of sector goals and objectives. Nonetheless, some of the NSAs commitments, particularly in the CAADP Compact, are not easily measurable. However, it would be useful to note recent developments regarding meeting them. Key civil society and private sector commitments include participating in policy dialogue, supporting capacity building in the sector, participating in conducting and disseminating research results and partnering government in developing the sector. The two groups state that some progress has occurred in participating in dialogues in order to influence the policy process. However, civil society expects better participation by their members in terms of feedback to others when they participate in activities on behalf of the group. The private sector sees more scope for more regular interaction with senior MoFA officials as one way to improve on their participation in policy dialogue. This would, of course, require cooperation from MoFA. Both groups recognize the importance of capacity building and are generally not satisfied with their performance in this area. Key challenges faced are funding and technical support. The private sector is also keen to influence policies that pertain to capacity building in order to ensure that the level of skills required to make reasonable progress is attained in the sector. Neither group is satisfied with the level of involvement of NSAs in research and would like to see an increased role in the identification and carrying out of research. However, they make effort to use available research output in dialoging with the government. In terms of the dissemination of agricultural practices, both groups agree that activities are ongoing like the use of SMS to disseminate agricultural information but highlight the need to work closer with extension services. Partnering with the government in project implementation is one area the two groups see as a challenge in recent times. They continually communicate ideas to the government on how to improve programs like the fertilizer subsidy and the Agricultural Mechanization Services Enterprise Centers (AMSEC). The private sector is willing to take over a number of the projects being implemented by the government—namely, in cases where implementation by the government has been seen to be inefficient. Further engagement with the government is the key to increasing partnerships in order to achieve the sector's objectives.

For farmers' associations, key commitments include participating in policy dialogue, investing in productive activities in the sector, helping to conduct and disseminate research results, and partnering government in

developing the sector. Only one of the three farmers' associations interviewed was satisfied with the level of engagement of farmer associations in the policy process. All three see their participation as being limited by the ability to collate views from their members for presentation to the government. According to the dissatisfied groups, they ought to be more involved in the early stages of policy formulation rather than being invited at the validation stages. They want more involvement in policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. As was noted by the civil society, ensuring good communication between members of the (farmers') associations is a challenge, which makes it difficult to keep track of the interactions of the group with the government. This needs to be improved upon in order to make the group more cohesive.

AgriServ (New Agricultural Services Limited) is a Ghanaian company actively engaged across the value chain in agricultural services and products spanning aquaculture, poultry, livestock, and crops. Under the New Alliance Cooperation Framework, AgriServ signed a letter of intent to partner with Pioneer (a DuPont business) to introduce hybrid seed maize that is both high yielding and drought tolerant to Ghana. Available in white and yellow varieties, these were expected to be the springboard not only for high-yield production but also for lowering production cost to farmers, thereby increasing their margin, profits, and assets. AgriServ expected to have five or six eventual partners, each with direct connections to between 3,000 and 10,000 smallholder farmers. The partners will provide a variety of services, including extension, tractors, storage, and warehousing. By offering high-yielding seeds, AgriServ's investments were to add value to the yellow maize value chain, which had an estimated demand of 200,000 metric tonnes annually for the poultry industry.

In an interview to find out the extent of attainment of AgriServ's commitments under the New Alliance cooperation framework, the AgriServ CEO stated that the company was able to introduce hybrid maize varieties into Ghana (both white and yellow maize varieties), which were released into the market in December 2013. The company has also been able to distribute the hybrid seed maize to about 10,000 smallholder farmers, mainly within their defined market. Yield levels of beneficiary farmers have reached 5 to 6 metric tonnes per hectare (mt/ha). Although the price of the hybrid seed maize is higher than the traditional seed maize on the local market, smallholder farmers still patronized AgriServ seed maize because it is high yielding and offers farmers more profit. AgriServ believes that it has been able to meet between 50 to 60 percent of its commitment under the New Alliance cooperation framework.

In terms of investment, the farmer groups appear to be more focused on contributing to improving the business climate than investing funds. Activities they have recently engaged in include signing memorandums of understanding (MoUs) and reaching agreements with commercial enterprises for the provision of machinery and high quality seeds and organizing farmers into clusters to benefit from these services. They have also given their members training on how to diversify their incomes. Two of the three farmers' associations state that they have recently conducted research on a number of issues important to their members and plan to improve on this with time while the third indicated the need for better funding of research and an increase in the number of agriculture extension agents. In the area of assisting in the dissemination of good agricultural practices, one notable activity the associations have done is reaching an agreement with the National Communications Authority to establish a television station to share and discuss issues affecting agriculture. In terms of partnering with the government in implementing activities, two of the three associations report that the partnership is weak. They would again want more involvement in the planning, implementation and evaluation of key projects. Like the private sector, they note key areas of weakness in major projects like the AMSEC and would welcome an opportunity to take on a more active role in running them.

As of May 18, 2012, a total of 15 companies, consisting of six local Ghanaian companies and nine international companies, made investment commitments by signing letters of intent. Available evidence indicates that the private sector has made reasonable progress in meeting its commitments (Grow Africa 2014). AgriServ, for example, has moved beyond pilot stage by gaining approval to scale up its investment. The firms generally

perceived that they have at least achieved 40–50 percent of their commitments under the NA framework. They mentioned that their key challenges are access to capital and land.

5.3.1. Commitments by Development Partners (DPs)

Of the six reporting New Alliance member countries, only Japan had reached and exceeded the commitment it made. The remaining reporting countries had achieved some level of progress ranging from 0.1 percent for France to 83 percent for the United Kingdom. Table 5.3 below provides an update on DPs' commitments. In addition to meeting their own financial commitments, development partners are also assisting with enabling actions in the sector. The World Bank is assisting with a risk-assessment report on the sector, which has been completed and presented at the 2014 Joint Sector Review. IFPRI and IITA-ReSAKSS West Africa assisted with an assessment of the JSR process.

Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) is assisting with seed technology, and IFPRI is assisting with a "Ten-Year Targets and Technology" platform. USAID is assisting with the Agriculture Fast-Track Facility, which is an innovative project preparation fund to catalyze the development of agricultural infrastructure in Africa's private sector. This fund exists to eliminate the weak link between the development partners' investments and those of the private sector.

A key recommendation from the private sector is that the location of development partners' projects should be made known to the private sector in order to encourage better leveraging of the projects in initiating or expanding private sector investments.

5.4. Summary

The government, development partners, and other nonstate actors have great roles to play to ensure successful implementation of sector policies and programs. Implementation of the policies as well as effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is only possible through support from committed stakeholders. From this study, it is clear that while some commitments have been progressively fulfilled, others have not. The key observation is that while the government has tried to fulfill its financial commitments, its nonfinancial commitments (including policies) remain only moderately achieved. This suggests that perhaps some of the targets under the METASIP are unrealistic or that implementation has been poor and M&E weak. The DPs are on track to meet their financial commitments under the New Alliance framework and are also making progress in related nonfinancial areas. The low rate of achievement of the government's financial commitments contrasts with this on-track performance and suggests that there is scope for more METASIP funding achievable from development partners.

TABLE 5.3: UPDATE ON DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' COMMITMENTS (IN US\$ MILLION)

Development Partner	Cooperation Framework Total Commitment	Estimated Proportion Committed through June 2014 or Most Recent Fiscal Year	Disbursement to Date	% Disbursed against Committed to Date	Traffic Light Rating	Comments
Canada	70.92	0	62.97			2013–2014 figures are still preliminary pending further quality assurance. Final figures will be officially released March 31, 2015. 2014–2015 figures are as of May 20, 2014 and remain preliminary pending further quality assurance.
European Union	37					Update not available
France	100	50	0.065574	0.13114754		Euro 17.9 million approved as of May 2014. Disbursements on projects approved or signed in this period.
Germany	69	20	16.56	82.8		
Japan	34	17	96.01	564.764706		Disbursement figure includes projects for nutrition-related activities. Exchange rate is 97.591 JPY to 1 USD for FY2013 disbursement figure and 79.8136 JPY for FY2012 (DAC exchange rate).
Russia	9					Update not available
United Kingdom	38	3	2.500449	83.3483		Delay in project initiation. Still expect to spend the £25m within the five-year period.
United States of America	225	135	37	27.4074074		Includes funding tranches in agriculture, subject to the availability of funds. To date.
Total	582.92	225	215.106			

Source: Compiled by USAID-Ghana.

6. AGRICULTURE SECTOR PERFORMANCE BASELINES

6.1. Introduction

The section assesses the performance of Ghana's agricultural sector over the past five years based on available data. The base year is regarded as 2010 for assessing progress with respect to recent trends or targets where applicable. A traffic light rating is applied where green represents an achievement of targets set, yellow indicates that some progress is being made, red indicates negligible progress, and gray indicates no data or not applicable.

6.2. Agriculture Expenditure, Inputs, and Services

Public agriculture expenditure in Ghana, which consists of government and development partners' expenditures, has increased in recent years from an average of 365 million Ghana cedis per year in 2008–2010 to 516 million Ghana cedis in 2011.³ However, the sector's share of total public expenditure decreased from an average of 12.1 percent per year in 2008–2010 to 11.2 percent in 2011 as indicated in Table 6.1 below. In 2010, it was relatively high at 16 percent before falling to 12.1 percent in 2011. Thus, there have been some improvements, although with fluctuations in recent years. In 2010 and 2011, the annual target of 10 percent was met. However, with lack of data for 2012 and 2013 we can only note with certainty that some progress has been made toward annually achieving this target in the last five years. It is therefore given a yellow rating.

TABLE 6.1: AGRICULTURE EXPENDITURE, INPUTS, AND SERVICES

Assessment Factors	2010	2015	2013 Progress Rating	2008–2010	2011*
Public agriculture expenditure	421			365	516
Total public expenditure	2,622			3,104	4,594
Public agriculture budget	511			411	538
Total public budget	6,585			6,036	7,926
Public agriculture expenditure (% of total expenditure)	16.0	10		12.1	11.2
Public agriculture budget (% of total budget)	8	10		7	7
Public expenditure (% of GDP)	5.7			8.6	7.7
Public agriculture expenditure (% of agriculture value added)	3.3			3.3	3.6
Share (%) of cultivated area that could be planted with the year's production of certified seeds (simple average for key crops)	10			9	7
Share of cultivated area irrigated (%)	0.25		0.33	0.23	0.31

Source: Based on *Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) Annual Report* (various years), MoFA (2013c), and FAO (2014).

Note: *Data on certified seeds covers 2008 and 2010–2012 while data on irrigation covers 2008 and 2009–2013.

In terms of the sector's share of the budget, there appears to be some stagnation with the 2011 share remaining at the 2008–2010 average. However, due to the slightly higher 2010 share of 8 percent we note that there has

³ Sector-wide expenditure data is normally obtained from public expenditure reviews. The latest one for the agriculture sector covers expenditure up to 2011.

been some fluctuation in it and this indicates that there has been some mixed progress over the years. It is also given a yellow rating. While the shares above cannot strictly be good indicators of performance in terms of the Maputo declaration (due to the inclusion of development partners' expenditure) they are good indicators of the level of funding the sector is getting.

While there has been some mixed progress in the sector's share of public expenditure, there is a clear problem with its share of expenditure relative to its contribution to GDP. While the average ratio of expenditure to GDP was 8.6 percent in 2008–2010, the corresponding ratio for the sector was 3.3 percent. In 2011, the ratio increased to 3.6 percent while that for the whole economy decreased to 7.7 percent. However, given the importance of the sector to poverty reduction and the lower agriculture sector ratio in both 2008–2010 and 2011, this area is given a red rating. At this stage in the country's development, the sector requires more funding in order to aid the transformation of the economy and reduce poverty.

Access to high quality seedlings has not been improving in recent years. Average area coverage of produced certified seeds of Maize, rice, cowpea, soybean, sorghum, and groundnuts decreased from 9 percent in the 2008–2010 period to 7 percent in the 2011–2012 period. This area is rated as red. In recent years, there has been slow progress made in terms of access to irrigation services: the proportion of cultivated area irrigated increased from .23 percent in 2008–2010 to .31 percent in the 2011–2013 period. However, this progress is negligible. With less than 1 percent of cultivated area being irrigated in the 2009–2013 period, a strong limitation is placed on potential crop productivity and production. This area is also given a red rating.

6.3. Agriculture Output

Agriculture's share of overall GDP fell from 27 percent in 2010 to 22 percent in the 2011–2013 period, indicating that its growth rate was below the overall GDP growth rate during this period. In absolute terms, agriculture GDP increased from an average of 6,453 million Ghana cedis in 2010 to an average of 6,722 million Ghana cedis in the 2011–2013 period (see Table 6.2). In the METASIP, targets were set for cash crops, livestock, and forestry incomes: a 30 percent increase of the 2008 cocoa income was targeted by 2015 while livestock and fishery incomes were targeted to increase by 25 percent. These targets have been met for cocoa and livestock while mixed progress (fluctuating income) has been experienced in fishery. Cocoa and livestock are therefore rated green while fishery is rated yellow. In terms of the CAADP target of 6 percent annual growth, a negative trend has been observed recently. The growth rate reduced from 5.3 percent in 2010 to an average of 2.8 percent in 2011–2013. This area is rated red and requires attention to reverse the decline.

TABLE 6.2: AGRICULTURE OUTPUT

Assessment Factors	2010	2015	2013	2008–2010	2011–2013
Agriculture value added (% of GDP)	27		22	27	22
Agriculture value added (million GhC constant 2006 prices)	6,453		7,003	6,099	6,722
Crops	4,703		5,204	4,415	4,999
Cocoa	677	662	710	574	727
Livestock	526	601	612	503	582

Fishery	467	610	492	472	461
Forestry and logging	757		695	709	680
Agriculture value added growth rate (%)	5.3	6.0	5.2	6.6	2.8
Crops	5.0		5.9	7.9	3.5
Cocoa	26.5		1.6	11.6	2.0
Livestock	4.8		5.3	4.7	5.2
Fishery	1.5		5.8	4.4	2.0
Forestry and logging	10.2		0.0	2.5	-2.4
Yields of key staples (tonnes/hectare)					
Maize	1.9	2.6	1.8	1.8	1.8
Rice	2.7	3.4	2.7	2.5	2.5
Cassava	15.4	20.3	18.6	14.3	17.1
Yam	15.5	21.1	17.0	14.9	15.7
Sorghum	1.3	1.8	1.2	1.3	1.2
Cowpea	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.3

Source: Based on GSS (2014) and MoFA (2014a, 2014c).

In the 2008–2010 period, the fastest growing subsector was crops at 7.9 percent while forestry and logging subsector had the least growth rate of 2.5 percent. In the 2011–2013 period, the growth rates ranged from 5.2 percent for the livestock subsector to -2.4 percent for the forestry and logging subsector. As such, the forestry and logging subsector had the lowest growth rates in both periods. It seems that value added from cocoa had a driving role in the 2008–2010 period with an average growth rate of 11.6 percent during this period while the entire crop subsector grew at 7.9 percent. This is also indicated by the 26.5 percent growth in 2010. However, in the 2011–2013 period, growth in cocoa value added reduced to a level below the subsector’s growth rate.

Mixed progress has been recorded recently in terms of yields of key crops. Of six staple crops, only two experienced increases in yields compared to their 2010 level. Cassava and yams experienced increases in the 2011–2013 period while cowpea did not experience a change. Maize, rice, and sorghum experienced decreases. In the METASIP, the yields of maize, rice, cassava, sorghum, and yam were targeted to increase by 50 percent by 2015 compared to their 2008 level while that of cowpea was set to increase by 25 percent. Currently, none of these targets have been met. Some progress can be said to have been made in cassava and yams, however, as increases are occurring at different paces. These crops are rated yellow. For the other crops where yields have stagnated or declined they are given a red rating

6.4. Agricultural Trade

Ghana’s agricultural exports increased from GHC 2,896 million in 2010 to GHC 4,695 million in the 2011–2012 period. In the 2008–2010 and 2011–2012 periods, exports grew at an average of 33 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Table 6.3 indicates recent trade in agriculture products. While the growth rate of exports decreased slightly, the growth rate of imports increased significantly: from 12 percent in 2008–2010 to 41 percent in the 2011–2012 period. The result of this was a deterioration in the agriculture exports to imports ratio from 1.4 in 2010 to 1.3 in the 2011–2012 period, respectively. This area is therefore rated as red.

In the METASIP, a clear aim of diversifying the country's exports basket was stated. The key exports in the past have been cocoa, timber, and timber products. The METASIP targeted a 50 percent increase of the 2008 volume of nontraditional exports of pineapple, mango, yam, banana, pawpaw, fish, and other seafood. Compared to the 2010 volumes, pineapple, mango, and pawpaw recorded increases in exports in the 2011–2013 period while yam, banana, and fish/seafood recorded decreases. Overall, the total volume of exports of these targeted nontraditional exports decreased from 131,563 tonnes in 2010 to 125,595 tonnes in the 2011–2013 period. In 2013, the level of exports was 44 percent lower than the 2008 level, and the 2015 target is to achieve a growth of 50 percent. This area is therefore rated as red.

TABLE 6.3: AGRICULTURAL TRADE

Assessment Factors	2010	2015	2013	2008–2010	2011–2013*
Agricultural exports (Million GhC)	2,896			2,195	4,695
Agricultural imports (Million GhC)	2,023			1,781	3,614
Growth of agriculture exports (%)	42			33	30
Growth of agriculture imports (%)	18			12	41
Ratio of value of total agricultural exports to total agricultural imports	1.4			1.2	1.3
Export of non-traditional commodities (tonnes)					
Pineapple	40,141		40,095	35,614	42,121
Mango	291		1,789	528	1,293
Yam	19,485		28,200	12,811	17,769
Banana	64,202		8,656	60,529	44,281
Pawpaw	813		1,118	891	821
Fish & Seafood	26,097		13,836	32,242	19,309
Total	131,563	25,1724	93,694	142,615	125,595
Growth in total compared with 2008	-21.6%	50.0%	-44.2%	-22.5%	-25.2%

Source: Based on Abusah et al. (2014) and MoFA (2014c).

*Data on total agricultural trade cover 2011–2012.

6.5. Poverty and Food Security

By 2006, Ghana had reduced its 1992 poverty level by 44 percent (from 51.1 percent in 1992 to 28.6 percent in 2006). Although confirmation will have to come from the recent household survey whose results have not yet been released, Ghana is expected to have achieved the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG1) by as early as 2010 with an average per capita GDP growth rate of 4 percent between 2006 and 2010. With an average GDP growth rate of 10.3 percent in the 2011 to 2013 period, further poverty reduction is expected to have taken place. More important, the GDP per capita growth rate averaged 7.9 percent during this period. These are indicators that the poverty rate has declined further in recent years. However, the falling growth rate of the agriculture sector indicates that the nonagriculture sector has been driving per capita GDP growth in recent years. Table 6.4 below indicates recent trends in welfare. With an increase in per capita GDP growth (from 5.5 percent in 2010 to an

average of 7.9 percent in the 2011–2013 period), this area may be given an interim yellow rating pending confirmation from the latest household survey regarding the fall in the poverty level.

TABLE 6.4: TRENDS IN GHANAIAN WELFARE, 2010–2015

Assessment Factors	2010	2015	2013	2008–2010	2011–2013
Per capita GDP growth rate (%)	5.5		4.8	4.2	7.9
Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)	<5%	22.2		6	<5%

Source: Based on GSS (2014) and UNSD (2014).

Another indication of the likelihood of reduced poverty at the national level is the low average food insecurity, as measured by the percentage of the population that is undernourished remained below 5 percent in the 2010–2012 period. This means that the country has achieved the MDG target for this indicator by more than halving the 44.4 percent prevalence of undernourishment in 1991. However, the estimated reduction in poverty and low food insecurity at the national level mask a disparity between urban and rural areas on the one hand and northern and other areas on the other. In 2006, the rural poverty rate was about four times that of the urban areas. In the north, the poverty rate was almost double the national incidence in 2006. While the national average prevalence of poverty and insecurity in the country are falling, the progress in some areas remains a challenge and deserves further attention. Based on the MDG target in this area, a green rating is given.

6.6. Summary

From these discussions, it seems that the contribution of the agriculture sector to poverty reduction has been declining in recent years, with key indicators of progress (such as sectoral growth) experiencing a decline recently. Fortunately, pre-2010 growth and poverty reduction achievements have aided the country in meeting key MDG targets. In recent years, the country also had to depend on the nonagriculture sector to drive per capita GDP growth. In order to reduce the geographical poverty gaps between urban and rural areas and between the northern and other regions, the agriculture sector will need to drive growth more in the coming years. This would require improvements in the volume and quality of spending; improved access to services and inputs; and improved policy and project planning, implementation, and evaluation.

7. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The JSR approach adopted by Ghana has gradually evolved to include wider consultation and increased stakeholder involvement. Ghana has also made good progress implementing sector policies and programs. However, this study illuminates some areas where special attention ought to focus.

In terms of leading the JSR process, the METASIP Steering Committee should play a stronger role, with support from the JSR Secretariat. The Steering Committee should lead the process of developing the agenda and terms of reference for the JSR in addition to engaging in a wider discussion with stakeholders. This study also observed poor participation by some stakeholders in the JSR process, which goes beyond just low attendance at meetings to a lack of adequate contributions in discussions. Stakeholders may not see the issues being discussed as their top priorities, they may lack confidence in the process or capacity to communicate effectively. In such a setting, dominated by MoFA and development partners, some stakeholders may also fear victimization for criticizing the government or leaders, particularly the political appointees. To avoid the setback caused by poor participation, the terms of reference production process for the JSR should be improved by increasing NSAs participation via the METASIP Steering Committee. Also, participants should be informed of their group and agenda prior to the JSR in order to have time to prepare and follow discussions at the JSR.

Implementation and monitoring of action plans from the JSR was also found to be inadequate. Clearly, there is a lack of follow-up on recommendations and action plans made in the JSR, and this needs to be improved upon. One way to do that might be to more clearly establish the membership and roles of the JSR Secretariat and others that may be tasked with following up on recommendations and action plans. We recommend that the various implementing agencies make regular progress reports on post-JSR implementation of the recommendations assigned to them. This will instill much more commitment to the implementation the JSR commitments.

In terms of preparing background reports and evidence for the JSR, the PPMED, SRID, and Ghana-SAKSS should be tasked with carrying out evaluations to contribute to the JSR. This will aid in institutionalizing the culture of policy-oriented research and support the current practice of knowledge sharing that takes place in the JSR. There should also be inclusion of progress assessment for different stakeholders in terms of commitments made (both within and outside the JSR) in the MoFA APR, which serves as the basis for the JSR. For example, progress made in meeting key policy commitments of the government needs to be reported in the APR. Such annual reporting will aid in institutionalizing the monitoring and evaluation of recommendations that stem from the JSR as key sectoral commitments. This can be aided by reports from the agriculture sector interministerial meetings currently being convened by the NDPC. The APR should also include a deeper evaluation of progress in the agriculture policy and institutional environment, agriculture funding, and other sectoral factors that affect the performance of the METASIP and the sector in general. This will contribute to identifying underlying factors that are contributing to the extent of progress recorded.

In terms of timing, the JSR requires many months of advance preparation to allow enough time to identify issues, collate information, and assemble available technical and financial resources in a more consultative way.

Additionally, the timing of the JSR is often after the sector's budget has been finalized, which means that additional implementation costs arising from the JSR recommendations is unbudgeted. But resource mobilization for implementing the recommendations of the JSR should be a priority, so the JSR should be rescheduled (from May to perhaps August) and its implementation costs included in the sector budget. Otherwise, a form of contingency fund should be established for implementation of all post-JSR recommendations.

Policy planning and implementation has also not been adequate due to capacity constraints, financial constraints, delays, and institutional lapses. As the lead agency, MoFA lacks technical capacity to implement some aspects of METASIP. Again there is poor and inconsistent funding of agricultural policy research and analysis institutions and organizations as well as logistics that will allow them to undertake investment planning with minimum stress. Frequent delays in release of funds for disbursement and, at times, complete failure to release funds at all also hamper implementation. Government and all sector stakeholders should honor their financial commitments to the sector by making funds available for implementation. MoFA should also liaise with staff from other ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) who have the requisite skills to support them with specific implementation challenges. They should also progressively work to improve coordination within and among sector stakeholders and other MDAs.

Also, availability of reliable data and evidence-based information is another major constraint to the design and implementation of sectors plans. Neither the GSS nor SRID is adequately resourced to collect the data and information required to produce an evidence-based investment plan. Research and information collected outside these organizations do not usually produce most of the required information and even if they do the knowledge management system is not good enough for the investment planner to know that it exists.

Although some key MDG goals of hunger and poverty reduction in Ghana have been achieved, the overall performance of the sector has declined in the past five years, as evidenced by the recent drop in sectoral growth rates. In many instances targets set under the METASIP and CAADP have not been achieved in recent years. However, on the policy commitments side, reasonable progress has been achieved.

The sector ministry also needs to improve its communications strategy to win the support of stakeholders. One key recommendation is to incorporate into the strategy some of the NSAs in the process from design of the strategy, planning, and dissemination of information. Another priority area is to focus on making the sources of all agriculture and agriculture-related data known, available, and accessible to all stakeholders.

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APPENDIX 1: STAKEHOLDER SUMMARIES ON JSR PROCESS

TABLE A1.1: SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDERS' VIEWS ON KEY ASPECTS OF THE JSR PROCESS

No.	JSR Building Blocks	Purpose/Tasks: Best Practices	What is the current practice in the country?	How does the current practice differ from best practice?	What actions are needed to achieve best practice?
1	Set Up a JSR Steering Committee (SC)	SC provides strategic Direction for the Establishment and Operation of the JSR. It is usually made up of 2 co-chairs from the Ministry of Agriculture and a leading donor agency And 3-4 other Representatives of key Stakeholder groups.	The policy sub-group of the Agricultural Sector Working Group (ASWG) of MoFA perform the role of SC. ASWG has MoFA co-chair & DP co-chair. ASWG provides strategic direction for the establishment of the JSR and also defines the agenda for JSR.	There is minimal private sector and farmer organizations representation or involvement in the ASWG. The ASWG is dominated by DPs and MOFA, and considers more perspectives from MoFA and DPs.	ASWG must be well structured to include private sector actors and farmer organizations who implement agriculture policies; the MSC could also take over this function as JSR/SC as it is a better and more balanced representation of the key stakeholders in the sector; there is the need for resource mobilization to achieve the best practice; train JSR/SC members on policy issues.
2	Establish a JSR Secretariat	Secretariat coordinates Activities and operations of the JSR and JSR SC. It can be made up of core Staff from The Planning & M&E Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture.	MoFA is the secretariat of JSR.	There is no permanent or specific secretariat so office of the M&E Director at PPMED, MoFA, takes charge and the structure and functions of this secretariat are unclear.	Establish permanent JSR Secretariat and employ staff members who are not loaded with other works and can have time for this assignment or the METASIP secretariat should be further strengthened and resourced to function as the JSR secretariat.
3	Develop Terms of Reference (TOR) for the JSR	ToR to lay out the JSR objectives and nonstate stakeholders and their roles, roles of the SC and Secretariat, operating principles, structure and frequency of JSR meeting and follow up and implementation of actions, etc. TOR may also need to be developed, consultants hired to conduct the JSR studies.	Each year the Policy subgroup of ASWG develops the TOR for the year's JSR. The objectives of the JSR are clearly known but the roles of the stakeholders are not clear. Roles are not really given to private sector and civil society to make inputs into the TOR The ASWG coordinates the implementation of actions from the JSR.	The MSC does not play much part in the development of the TOR. There is Poor follow up and implementation. Many stakeholders attend meetings but do not participate because they do not have specific assigned roles.	The JSR should be given a fixed date possibly before the budgeting process starts at the end of the year. Key studies should be identified on time. Key roles should be given to stakeholders. Include relevant NSAs whose activities are directly connected to agriculture to develop a clear ToR for the JSR. The TOR should be made known/ disseminated to all stakeholders. A well designed implementation plan and responsibility for JSR follow up is needed.
4	Mobilize resources	Mobilize resources (human and financial) to support operations of the JSR.	No specific resources are set aside for JSR activities in GoG budget. Both GoG and DP support JSR. However for the past 2 years, it has been funded by DPs, while operations are done by core staff from MoFA with some technical support from DPs.	Most activities from JSR recommendations are funded by Development Partners. There is laxity in the current system of resource mobilization.	A dedicated fund should be set for JSR. As a key government activity, it should be part of the government's annual budget. There should be mutual accountability Private sector can also be allowed to do exhibitions in order to fund the meetings.

No.	JSR Building Blocks	Purpose/Tasks: Best Practices	What is the current practice in the country?	How does the current practice differ from best practice?	What actions are needed to achieve best practice?
5	SC/Secretariat invites a broad and inclusive group of state and nonstate actors/stakeholders to participate in the JSR (With clear objectives, expected outcomes, and roles of different actors)	A key feature of the JSR is that it allows broad group of state and nonstate stakeholders to influence overall policies and priorities of the sector by assessing how well they have implemented their commitments stipulated in the CAADP compact, NAIP, and related cooperation agreements such as under the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition.		The current practice is imbalanced compared with best practices with respect to state and nonstate stakeholder composition. Thus, it does not have enough participation of nonstate actors. The current practice is more aligned or bias towards cash crops for export and a METASIP for donor appeal. Nonstate stakeholders are involved but the govt. and MoFA outnumber private sector and other NSAs.	More NSA organizations should be brought on board. Identify roles in the METASIP to be performed by the various stakeholders who would be held responsible for the success or failure of those tasks; this would make them more accountable and also demand accountability from the govt. sector. Information material must reach private sector actors in time to contribute to discussion.
6	Commission JSR studies	Consultants may need to be hired and supervised by the SC to conduct JSR studies. Consultants can come from think tanks, universities, or private companies and should work closely with staff from the planning unit, and the JSR SC and Secretariat.	Studies are not normally commissioned or when done, it is commissioned late. Only the Annual progress report by MoFA attempts to be a standing report which discusses progress The reports are circulated to stakeholders for comments and then the policy sub-committee of ASWG meets with the consultants to review the study. For instance, in last year the consultant's METASIP review report was reviewed by the Ag. sector working group.	No team is formed specifically to review study. It is done during a forum with the consultants of the study.	A fixed date for the JSR would make it easier to commission studies on time. The APR should be used to document progress in the sector as whole with inputs from all stakeholders. A fixed date for the JSR and APR production would allow all stakeholders prepare submissions to the APR. More coordination between the consultants of the study and the ASWG, MSC, PPMED, and SAKSS. Use the policy subgroup of ASWG, METASIP SC, PPMED, and JSR SC to review reports.
7	Establish JSR Review Team*	Team made up of multi-stakeholder groups (state and nonstate actors) with technical expertise to review and comment on various JSR studies and reports and ensures outputs of reviews are implemented.	Recently, review teams are not commissioned. A JSR report is presented and CDs distributed.	Recently, review teams are not commissioned.	Review teams should be established.
8	Prepare JSR Report	Preparing evidence based on relevant high-quality studies and reports on the JSR content areas. To be effective mutual accountability process, the JSR Report will need to be grounded in high quality data and analysis as well as transparency and inclusive stakeholder participation.	Only the APR is prepared as the basic background document for the JS.	Evidence biased towards DPs, MoFA projects and what politicians want to satisfy their electorates about.	The APR should be used to discuss the sector as a whole rather than METASIP programs only. Inputs should come from other MDAs, civil society, farmer groups etc. A standard format for obtaining the required information should be designed and circulated annually. Reports need to be factual and capture relevant data.

No.	JSR Building Blocks	Purpose/Tasks: Best Practices	What is the current practice in the country?	How does the current practice differ from best practice?	What actions are needed to achieve best practice?
9	Conduct JSR Meeting	Organize meeting over 1–3 days using various formats (plenary, small groups, field visit, etc.) to allow stakeholders to discuss/verify the evidence and recommendations presented in the JSR Report. This can be done at different levels (national and sub-national). The process should assist in identifying sector priorities and policies and specific actions for the different stakeholders to put in place. These would be captured in a JSR Aide Memoir.	JSR meetings are conducted for 1–3 days with panel discussions, plenary, and group work. Organized at the national level only.	Pre-JSR meetings to consider the APR are not done. However, the APR is circulated for comments before it is finalized. The subnational level is left out.	The APR should be circulated to more people via email and pre-JSR meetings. Should be organized at the subnational levels since at the sub-national levels participants will effectively contribute to discussion on topical issues to bring improvement in the agriculture sector. Better participation of stakeholders in JSR activities well before JSR and in JSR. Building the capacities of all stakeholders to be able to make informed recommendation. Field visits can be added as a means of verification or validation.
10	Follow-up on JSR Meeting	Closely monitor and ensure implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the JSR meeting (embodied in the JSR Aide Memoir). Groups that meet more regularly such as the Agriculture Sector Working Group can help with follow up and the monitoring. The monitoring forms the basis of the next JSR cycle.	Recently the agriculture sector working group undertakes follow-up. Issues raised are followed up and form the basis for new MoFA projects and the next JSR cycle.	There were constraints in resource availability so the action plan could not be implemented in many years.	A carefully constituted team should be tasked with implementation to speed up the implementation of the recommendations and improve efficiency because ASWG are very busy and overburdened. Provision of adequate resources both (human & financial). Benchmark recommendations in terms of extent to which agriculture productivity increases.
11	Share JSR Experience with other Countries	As many countries are still setting up JSR, it is essential to share lessons learned, best practices and experience to further strengthen country JSRs. Forums such as the CAADP PP and ReSAKSS Annual Conference provide an opportunity to do this.	Experience sharing with other countries is nonexistent.	No experience sharing in the current system of practice compared with the best.	Workshop can be organized to invite participants from different countries to share experiences. Institutionalize dissemination and comparisons with other regional country reports.

TABLE A1.2: LIST OF KEY PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

No.	Stakeholder Group/Organization	Name	Professional Title
1	MoFA/PPMED	Lena Otoo	Deputy Director
2	MoFA/PPMED	Lambert Abusah	Deputy Director
3	MoFA/PPMED	Angela Dansson	Deputy Director
4	MoFA/PPMED	Dorothy Effa	S.A.O.
5	ReSAKSS WA, IITA	Manson Nwafor	Policy Analyst
6	IFAD	Neils Bossen	A.C.P.M.
7	Africa Lead	Cecilia Addae	Component III-NSAs Manager

8	Africa Lead	Dr. John Azu	Consultant
9	Action Aid Ghana	Queronica Quartey	Policy & Company Manager
10	AgriServ	Raja A. Najjar	CEO
11	Foodspan	Kenneth Amoaten	
12	PEF	Nana Osei Bonsu	
13	GNAFF	John Dziwornu	
14	Peasant Farmers' Association	Victoria Adongo	
15	Ghana Agriculture Workers Union	Kingsley Nkrumah	

TABLE A1.3: TOTAL STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED, BY GROUP

Stakeholder Group	Stakeholders Interviewed
MoFA	7
DPs	6
NGOs	2
Private sector	5
Researcher from government institution	1
NDPC	1
Total	22

TABLE A1.4: STUDY INCEPTION MEETING ATTENDANCE LIST

No.	Name	Directorate/Organization	Designation
1	LAMBERT ABUSAH	PPMED/MoFA	DEP. DIR.
2	CECILIA ADDAE	DAI, AFRICA LEAD	COMPONENT MANAGER
3	YAKUBU IDDRISU	USAID/FTF AGRIC POLICY PROJECT	POLICY ADVOCACY
4	KWAKO OWUDRI BACH	APSP	AG.COP
5	DANSO FELIX	PPMED/MoFA	NSP
6	GIFTY OPPONG	PPMED/MoFA	NSP
7	STEPHEN FRIMPONG	UNU-INRA	CONSULTANT
8	ALFRAD APPIAH	DEPT. OF	CONSULTING ASSISTANT
9	PORGO MOHAMED	PPMED/MoFA	
10	JOSEPHNE QUAGRINE	PPMED/MoFA	ASSIT. DIRECTOR
11	ULAC DEMIRAG	IFAD	COUNTRY REP.
12	EMMANUEL GARTI	PPMED/MoFA	AGRIC ECON.
13	RUBY NEILS-PALME	PPMED/MoFA	S.A.ECONOMIST
14	ALICE OBENG	MOF B.D	PRINCIPAL A.
15	PAULNIA S. ADDY	WIAD/MoFA	DEPT. DIRECTOR
16	JEREMY O. AGYEMAIG	PPMED/MoFA	S.A. ECONOMIST
17	LENA OTOO	PPMED/MoFA	DD
18	SAMUEL ASUMING-BREMPOG	NIM OF GHANA	CONSULTANT
19	APAU BENJAMINKORANTANG	PPMED/MoFA	NSP

20	NICHOLAS NEEQHANYE	PPMED/MoFA	DEP. DIR.
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TABLE A1.5: STUDY VALIDATION MEETING ATTENDANCE LIST

No.	Name	Organization
1	JOHN AWUKU DZIWOMU	GHANA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FARMERS
2	PRINCE MARTIN GYEKEY	CSIR
3	ALICE OBENG	MOF
4	PHYLLIS MENDS	SRID-MoFA
5	RUBY N.	PPMED-MoFA
6	GIFTY OPPONG	PPMED-MoFA
7	BONTY EFTA	PPMED
8	LAMBERT ABUSAH	MoFA
9	AYUEBORO ADOWUSA	MoFA
10	JEREMY AGYEMONG	PPMED-MoFA
11	QUERONICA Q. QUARTEY	ACTIONAID GHANA
12	NICHOLAS NEEQUAYO	PPMED-MoFA
13	DANSO FELIX	PPMED-MoFA
14	PONGO MOHAMED	PPMED-MoFA
15	JONH AZU	AFRICA LEAD
16	CECILIA ADDAE	AFRICA LEAD
17	FESTUS AGOABASNAN	AFRICA LEAD
18	KWAHA QUADRI BAAH	USAID AGRIC POLICY SUPPORT PROJECT
19	STEPHEN FIRMONG	STUDY TEAM MEMBER (UG)
20	ALFRAD APPIAH	STUDY TEAM MEMBER (UG)
21	M. NWAFOR	IITA-RESAKSS
22	Fenton Sands	USAID
23	WOLTER NUNEG	USAID AGRIC POLICY SUPPORT PROJECT
24	KWAKU BOATONG	APFOG
25	KENNUTA MANG	ABIBIMAN FOUNDATION
26	RAJA A.	AGRIC SERVE
27	ERNEST BINEY	FONG
28	PETER OBEY-KORANTEY	YARA GH
29	DANGNET ADDO-YOBO	YAHA GHANA
30	KINGSLEY ADOFO-ADDO	ECOBANK

TABLE A1.6: UPDATE ON METASIP EXPENDITURE

Programme/Component		Yearly Commitment (GHC, million)			Total Commitment due by Current Review Period (2013)	Expenditure Estimate/Meeting Commitments (GHC, million)			Progress by Current Review Period (expenditures to 2013)	Commitment Gap/ Excess (GHC, million)
		2011	2012	2013		2011	2012	2013		
Programme 1: Food Security and Emergency Preparedness										
1.1	Productivity Improvement	33.3	72.2	14.5	120.0		116.3	122.4	238.7	118.7
1.2	Improved Nutrition	2.3	4.2	4.2	10.7				0.0	-10.7
1.3	Diversification of Livelihood Options for the Poor	2.2	7.3	6.5	16.0	15.6			15.6	-0.4
1.4	Food Storage and Distribution	0.1	0.4	0.7	1.2		21.2	31.1	52.2	51.0
1.5	Early Warning Systems and Emergency preparedness	3.4	1.3	1.3	6.0				0.0	-6.0
1.6	Irrigation and Water Management	11.1	64.9	85	161.0				0.0	-161.0
1.7	Mechanization Services	20	20	20	60.0				0.0	-60.0
Total Programme 1		72.4	170.3	132.2	374.9	15.6	137.5	153.5	306.5	-68.4
Programme 2: Increased Growth in Incomes										
2.1	Promotion of Crop, Livestock and Fishery Production for income	53.2	43.8	52.6	149.6		3.8	2.6	6.3	-143.3
2.2	Development of New Products	2.1	2	2	6.1				0.0	-6.1
2.3	Pilot Value Chain Development	40.7	40.5	40.5	121.7	55.3	6.6	0.7	62.6	-59.1
2.4	Intensification of FBOs and Out-grower Concepts	1.5	1.5	0.9	3.9				0.0	-3.9
2.5	Development of Rural Infrastructure	94.9	96.6	86.4	277.9				0.0	-277.9
2.6	Urban and Peri-urban Agriculture	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.8				0.0	-0.8
Total Programme 2		192.7	184.7	182.6	560.0	55.3	10.4	3.2	68.9	-491.1
Programme 3: Increased Competitiveness and Enhanced Integration into Domestic and International Markets										
3.1	Marketing of Ghanaian Produce in Domestic and International Markets	5.3	4.7	4.6	14.6	0.7	8.2	9.5	18.4	3.8
Total Programme 3		5.3	4.7	4.6	14.6	0.7	8.2	9.5	18.4	3.8
Programme 4: Sustainable Management of Land and Environment										

Programme/Component		Yearly Commitment (GHC, million)			Total Commitment due by Current Review Period (2013)	Expenditure Estimate/Meeting Commitments (GHC, million)			Progress by Current Review Period (expenditures to 2013)	Commitment Gap/ Excess (GHC, million)
		2011	2012	2013		2011	2012	2013		
4.1	Awareness Creation and Use of SLM Technologies by Men and Women Farmers	1.6	6.8	6.6	15.0	19.8	0.0		19.8	4.8
Total Programme 4		1.6	6.8	6.6	15.0	19.8	0.0		19.8	4.8
Programme 5: Science and Technology Applied in Food and Agricultural Development										
5.1	Uptake of Technology along the Value Chain and Application of Biotechnology in Agriculture	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.5	30.6	0.1	0.0	30.7	29.2
5.2	Agricultural Research Funding and Management of Agricultural Research Information	10	10	10	30.0					-30.0
Total Programme 5		10.4	10.5	10.6	31.5	30.6	0.1	0.0	30.7	-0.8
Programme 6: Enhanced Institutional Coordination										
6.1	Institutional Strengthening for Intra-ministerial Coordination	0.2	0.3	2.4	2.9	36.1	39.3	45.9	121.2	118.3
6.2	Inter-ministerial Coordination	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.7					-0.7
6.3	Organizations Partnership with Private Sector and Civil Society	1	0.5	0.5	2.0					-2.0
6.4	Coordination with Development Partners	0.7	0.3	0.3	1.3					-1.3
Total Programme 6		2.1	1.3	3.4	6.8	36.1	39.3	45.9	121.2	114.4
Total METASIP		284.5	378.3	340	1,002.8	158.0	195.5	212.1	565.6	-437.2
Total Investment Cost										
		282.1	375.9	337.6	995.6	134.0	126.7	31.4	292.1	-703.5
Total Recurrent Cost										
		2.2	2.6	2.5	7.3	24.0	68.8	180.8	273.5	266.2
Compensation of Employees										
						63.6	66.8	80.3	210.7	
Total Expenditure						221.6	262.2	292.5	776.3	

Source: MoFA.

Note: The total amount committed each year to funding METASIP comprises of recurrent expenses and investment expenses. These two expenses form the METASIP funding commitment, but the expenditures specified are not from government only. The METASIP funding commitment or expenditure plus employee compensation (other personal emoluments) form the total expenditure